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WILL THE U.S.S.R. SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?
The answer to Andrei Amalrik's question of whether
the Soviet Union will survive until 1984, may very well
be the answer to the question of whether the present
system can accommodate that political opposition which
calls itself the "Democratic Movement."^

A growing

awareness among elements of Soviet society that MarxismLeninism has become irrelevant has resulted in tendency
conflict between self-preservation and power.

For as

Amalrik puts it, "in order to remain in power, the
regime must change and evolve, but in order to preserve
2
itself, everything must remain unchanged."
He feels
that the corruption of the cause has "...reached the sad
point where the idea of power is no longer connected
with either a doctrine, the personality of a leader or
3
a tradition, but only wxth power itself."
The regime,
he says, is one of bureaucrats, and is interested only
in self-preservation.

The "middle-class" or "class of

specialists" upon which the Democratic Movement could

^Amalrik, Andrei, Will the Soviet Union Survive
Until 1984? New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.,
1970, p. 10.
2

loc. cit., p. 22.

^ibid.
1
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seemingly base itself in its attempt at rejuvenation or
peaceful reconstruction of the political system is
believed by him to be too passive.

Even the part of

the "middle-class" upon which the Democratic Movement
presently bases itself is found by him to be "...too
weak and too beset by internal contradictions to engage
in a real face-to-face struggle with the regime or, in
the event of the regime's self-destruction or its
collapse as a result of mass disorders, to become a
force capable of reorganizing society in a new way."'*'
Furthermore, he feels that the "passive discontent" of
the masses is not likely to be harnessed by the Demo
cratic Movement because "...the idea of self-government,
of equality before the law and of personal freedom—
and the responsibility that goes with these— are almost
2
incomprehensible to the Russian people."
As the
regime becomes progressively weaker, he sees the de
structive movement of the "lower classes" taking "...the
form of extremely damaging, violent and irresponsible
action once its members realize their relative immunity
from punishment."

3

^loc. cit., p. 32.
2
loc. cit., p. 33.
3
loc. cit., pp. 41-42.
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In his analysis of the Soviet system, Amalrik does
leave room for the possibility of those representing
political authority taking some action which might re
juvenate the system.

However, he is convinced that

decisive and forthright measures of €Kis sort are not
forthcoming.

To him, it appears more likely that those

representing political authority will merely continue to
make the minimal necessary changes so as to stay in
power.

For "any fundamental change would require such

a drastic shake-up in personnel from top to bottom that,
understandably, those who personify the regime would
never embark on it.

To save the regime at the cost of

firing themselves would seem to them too exorbitant and
unfair a price to pay."'*'
Yet despite Amalrik's lack of confidence in the
ability of those representing" political authority to
save the system, investigation cannot overlook the
"inputs" of the political system— which are regarded by
2
Easton as an essential element of every political
system.

That is, the form of administration does not

preclude the articulation and aggregation of interests

^loc. cit., p. 43.
2
Easton, David, "An Approach to the Analysis of
Political Systems." World Politics. IX (April 1957),
pp. 383-400.
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characteristic of all political systems.

The top

political authority personalities and the apparatchiki
are not the sole political actors in the Soviet system.
For behind the facade of the monolithic party, strug
gles that represent more than the simple conflicts of
personal ambition take place.
The new version of Soviet politics that slowly
began to emerge after the death of Stalin has challenged
the concept of the Soviet political system as a totali
tarian system in which a single party, itself free of
internal conflict, imposes its will on society and on
all social groups.^"

Although this cannot be described
2
as genuine pluralism, Skilling feels that it can be

regarded as a kind of imperfect monism in which, of the
many elements involved, one— the party— is more powerful
than all the others but is not omnipotent.

For he is

convinced that "although decision-making in its final
stage still remains in the hands of a relatively small
group of leaders at the top of the party hierarchy,
there has been...a broadening of group participation in
the crucial preliminary stages of policy deliberation

1Skilling, H. Gordon, "Interest Groups and Com
munist Politics." In Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics. edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971, p. 17.
2ibid.
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and in the subsequent phase of implementation."^

It is

this group activity which, in articulating policy
expectations, results in "...the emergence of, and
selection from, a series of alternate possible direc
tions of value allocation— tendencies of articulation—
for Soviet society."

2

Thus, the articulations of the

Democratic Movement will be influential only to the
extent that they form part of existing tendencies or
lead to the setting up of possible alternate directions
of value allocation for the system.
If the articulations of the Democratic Movement
are examined and found to have generated a conflict of
dominant tendencies of articulation prior to, during,
and after the taking of official decisions, it can be
assumed that they do represent effective variants of
policy.

Furthermore, "...fluctuations in value alloca

tion or in the policy 'line' may be seen as shifts in
the relative influence of conflicting tendencies."

^Skilling, H. Gordon, "Groups in Soviet Politics:
Some Hypotheses," in Interest Groups in Soviet Poli
tics . edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971
p. 19.
2

Griffiths, Franklyn, "A Tendency Analysis of
Soviet Policy-Making," in Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics. edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971
p. 336.
3
loc. cit., p. 361.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Therefore, a tendency analysis of the Soviet political
system that demonstrated the possibility of adducing
situational variables that would allow accommodation of
the Democratic Movement by the political system would
increase the likelihood of an affirmative answer to
Amalrik's question.

The present tendency analysis study

examines the Soviet political system for this logical
possibility of accommodating the Democratic Movement of
which Amalrik writes.

The essential question for which

an answer was sought is whether the known facts concern
ing, and the history of, Amalrik’s Democratic Movement
support his apocalyptic predictions concerning the end
of the great Eastern Slav empire or, instead, support a
case for the integrative capacity of the Soviet system.
The Procedure for the Analysis
The following tendency analysis of the Soviet
system approximates the four stages set forth by
Griffiths.^

Initially there is an exploration of the

history and ideational development of the Democratic
Movement in the post-Stalin Soviet Union.

This includes

a search for the presence of uniformities in the
articulations of the Democratic Movement and a con
sideration of underlying variables that might help to

^loc. cit., p. 361.
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explain the observed propensities of given actors and
groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate
common or converging expectations of policy.

There

follows a brief discussion of systemic criticism and
the effect of dissent on the Soviet polity as reflected
in policy shifts induced by the Democratic Movement.
Finally, the possibilities for the development of a
pluralistic political system are sought from a look at
subsystem interaction and the context of the whole in
which interaction must take place.

Here situational

variables are adduced to project the course of tendency
conflict in the political system as a whole and,
thereby, aid in the determination of system adaptabil
ity.

Robert Dahl's^" seven sets of complex conditions

that favor the development of a high level of partici
pation in a highly competitive public contestation
environment are utilized to create a suggestive profile
of the Soviet Union's potential for polyarchy.
The Soviet dissidents whose articulations and
propensities are investigated as constituting the
Democratic Movement are those whose philosophical view
points support one or another of the three ideologies

Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and
Opposition. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1971.
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upon which Amalrik feels the Democratic Movement is
founded.

"They are 'genuine Marxism-Leninism,'

•Christian ideology' and 'liberal ideology.'"1
"'Genuine Marxism-Leninism' contends that the
regime, having perverted Marxist-Leninist ideology
for its own purposes, does not practice real MarxismLeninism, and that in order to cure the ills of..."
Soviet "...society it is essential to return to the
2
true principles of that doctrine."
The two repre
sentatives of "genuine Marxism-Leninism" most widely
known in the West are probably Major-General Peter
Grigorenko and Roy A. Medvedev.
"Supporters of 'Christian ideology' maintain that
the life of society must return to Christian moral
principles, which are interpreted in a somewhat
Slavophile spirit, with a claim for a special role for
Russia."2

It is essential to understand, however, that

what Amalrik calls "Christian ideology" is "...a politi
cal doctrine and not a religious philosophy or an
ecclesiastical ideology, representatives of which would
be more correctly regarded as members of the Cultural

1Amalrik, op. cit., p. 11.
2ibid.
2loc. cit., pp. 11-12.
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Opposition."^

Members of the "Cultural Opposition" do

not primarily, or even necessarily, seek fundamental
political change.

While opposed to what they perceive

as intervention in their respective endeavors, they
are not directly interested in politics.

Often, how

ever, cultural opposition is but the first step on the
road to political opposition.

Anyway, "Christian

ideology" was the inspiration behind the "All-Russian
Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the
People" which was based at Leningrad University and,
reportedly, had offshoots in Tomsk and Irkutsk.

2

"Finally, believers in 'liberal ideology' ulti
mately envisage a transition to a Western kind of
democratic society, which would, however, retain the
principle of public or governmental ownership of the
means of production."^

Academician Andrei D.

Sakharov, the man some Soviet citizens describe as
the "father of the Soviet H-bomb," and Pavel Litvinov,

^loc. cit., p. 12n.
2
loc. cit., p. 12; Reddaway, Peter, "Freedom of
Worship and the Law." In In Quest of Justice: Protest
and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today, edited by
Abraham Brumberg. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970,
p. 71. During trials in late 1967 and early 1968,
twenty members of the group received sentences ranging
up to fifteen years at forced labor.
3
Amalrik, op. cit., p. 12.
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10
grandson of the Soviet diplomat who negotiated the
1933 American recognition of the Soviet state, are un
doubtedly the two best known representatives of "liberal
ideology."
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THE HISTORY AND IDEATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE
POST-STALIN SOVIET UNION
At the turn of the century the democratic movement
in Tsarist Russia was relatively small, weak, and
detached from the masses.

Much of this already tiny

minority had either fled or been killed by the con
clusion of the Civil War, and the devastating purges
of the thirties further decimated its ranks.

Little

wonder, then, that the handful of those who survived
these cataclysms relented to fearful pressures to remain
silent.

Most recently, however, free-thinking individ

uals of all ages have come to call for fundamental
changes in Soviet society.
The most obvious, and crucial, precondition for
this evolution of courage and conscience was the elim
ination of random mass police terror after Stalin's
death.

Because the reflex of distrust and deception

was not easy to overcome, though, stirrings of dis
satisfaction were limited to the cultural sphere, to
censorship and other forms of non-political control.
Thus, the real preface to current dissident turmoil was
written by Nikita Khrushchev in February of 1956.
Stalin's death had dealt an incorrigible blow to the
Soviet religiosthetic system, but Khrushchev's speech
11
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at the 20th Party Congress dealt the mortal blow to the
teleological structure of Soviet society.

Skepticism

about the basic values of the system began to emerge, and
without that all-seeing and all-powerful tyrant legend
upon which the whole of socialism had come to depend, a
new pattern of regime behavior vis-a-vis society began
to develop.

Without a Stalin to give commands, the

regime became inconsistent, sterile, uninventive, and,
therefore, insecure.

With only terror as a tool, the

regime became the victim of its own needs.
Already in late 1956 militiamen on horseback had
to intervene when a meeting held to discuss Vladimir
Dudintsev's novel, Not By Bread Alone, turned into a
riot.^

By 1958, Boris Pasternak had been awarded the

Nobel Prize for Literature for his novel. Dr. Zhivago.
And it was also during this period that Yevgeny
Yevtushenko spoke out and became the representative of
2
the younger generation.
Yet, these developments were
harshly arrested because the regime failed to recognize
them as an opportunity to revitalize the system.

The

^Gaucher, Roland, Opposition In The U.S.S.R.:
1917-1967. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969, pp. 490-91.
2
ibid. Also in Turner, John E., "Artists In
Adversity: The Sinyavsky-Daniel Case," in Political
Trials. edited by Theodore L. Becker. New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., p. 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
civic-minded began to doubt the ability of Khrushchev to
revive genuine Marxism-Leninism, and turned against him
after the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution.

For his

part, Khrushchev had no intention of allowing anything
remotely resembling the Hungarian Petoefi Circle to be
formed in the Soviet Union by those who demonstrated
their gratitude for his liberalization with ever greater
demands.

Thus, in the course of 1957 and early 1958

the most revolutionary-minded were arrested and sen
tenced to long terms in concentration camps.^
Now the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's deStalinization speech led to conditions more favorable
to independent and creative scientific research in the
USSR.

"For during a quarter of a century every science

without exception ran the humiliating and destructive
gauntlet of Stalinist power.

What Stalinism meant to

Soviet scientists is illustrated by the story of the
advent to power of a fanatical and incompetent agronomist
named Trofim Lysenko through the personal favor of
2
Stalin."
This is how Feuer describes the effect of

■^Pospielovsky, Dimitri, "Some Aspects of the
History and Ideational Development of the Dissident
Movement in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union." A paper
presented at the Tenth Anniversity (11th Annual) Central
Slavic Conference, held 17-18 November 1972 at William
Jewell College, Liberty, Missouri, p. 11.
2
Feuer, Lewis S., "The Intelligentsia in Opposi
tion." Problems of Communism. (March/April 1966), 2.
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14
Stalin on Soviet science.

He says that "every domain of

science had its Lysenko, its embittered, jealous medio
crity who, driven by envy of those who had made genuine
contributions, contrived to obtain administrative power
over them by denouncing them to his fellow mediocrities
in the political apparatus."^

With the relaxation of

the ideological shackles, Soviet scientists lost little
time in rebuking the political theologians and shelving
Marxist ideology.
At the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October,
1961, Khrushchev made a violent attack on his rivals,
the so called "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Malenkov,
and Voroshilov.

In his attack, Khrushchev exploited to

the full the theme of the abuses of Stalinism.

This

new denunciation of the cult of personality produced a
"thaw" in cultural life when Khrushchev attempted to
gain the support of the liberal intellectuals by relax
ing censorship.

Yevtushenko was appointed to the

editorial board of the magazine Yunost and his poem
"The Heirs of Stalin," which was published in Pravda in
October of 1962, was of great significance for
Khrushchev's political offensive.

The poem, recited

frequently by Yevtushenko at poets' meetings between
the conclusion of the Twenty-Second Congress and when

1ibid.
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it finally appeared in print, was a direct attack on the
opponents of de-Stalinization:
Mute was the marble.
Mutely glimmered the glass.
Mute stood the soldiers on guard,
bronzed by the
breeze.
Thin smoke curled above the coffin.
And breath seeped through the
chinks
as they bore him out the mausoleum doors.
Slowly the coffin floated,
grazing the fixed
bayonets.
He also was mute—
he also!
mute and dread.
Grimly clenching
his embalmed fists,
only pretending to be dead,
he spied from inside.
In his memory he wished to engrave
each of his
pallbearers:
young recruits from Ryazan and Kursk,
that afterwards in some way
he might find enough
strength for a sortie,
rise from the grave,
and reach out to these un
reasoning youths.
He was scheming something,
had merely dozed off to
rest.
And I, addressing our Government, petition them to
double, and triple the soldiers on guard by
this slab,
lest Stalin rise again
and, with Stalin,
the past.
I don't refer to the past, so holy and glorious,
of Turksib,
and Magnitka,
and the flag hoisted over
Berlin.
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By the past, in this case,
I've in mind the neglect
of the good of the people,
false accusations,
the
arrest
of in
nocent
men.
We sowed our crops honestly.
Honestly we smelted metal,
and honestly we marched,
falling into the ranks.
But he feared us.
Believing in the great goal,
he judged any odious means
good enough to that great
end.
He was far-sighted.
Skilled in the art of political
strife,
he left many heirs
here on the globe.
I fancy
a telephone installed in that coffin:
Stalin gives directions
to Enver Hoxha.
Where else from that coffin does the cable lead!
No, Stalin has not given in.
He thinks he can
outwit
death.
We bore him out of the mausoleum.
But how, out of Stalin, shall we bear
Stalin's heirs!
Some of his heirs trim roses in retirement
secretly thinking
their discharge is temporary.
Others,
from rostrums, even heap abuse on Stalin
but,
at night,
hanker after the good old days.
No wonder Stalin's heirs seem stricken
with heart attacks these days.
They, once the
stalwarts
detest this time
of empty prison camps
and halls packed with people listening
to poets.
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The Party forbids me
to be smug.
"Why bother?"
some urge me— but I can't be quiet.
While the heirs of Stalin walk this earth,
Stalin,
.
I fancy, still lurks in the mausoleum.
Thus, "...for roughly three years (until the cultural
crackdown of 1963) scarcely a month passed when a young
writer or poet did not publish a work of the imagination, each bolder in form and substance than the last."

2

When editions of the new literature became unavailable
due to the small size of the printings allowed by the
regime, a rage for public readings of poetry seized the
Soviet Union.
The most spectacular of these readings took
place in November 1962 in Moscow's Luzhniki
Sports Stadium where 14,000 people gathered
to hear Voznesensky, Akhmadulina and Boris
Slutsky. Poetry readings on a more modest
scale had become the principle entertainment
of intellectuals and students in Moscow, and
in provincial towns as well, where poets
went by the truckload.
The hopes of this period were perhaps best expressed
by the poet and editor Alexander Tvardovsky:

"In art

and literature, as in love, one can lie only for a while;

As translated by George Reavey in Half-way to the
Moon: New Writing from Russia. edited by Patricia Blake
and Max Hayward. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books
1965, pp. 177-180.
2
Blake, Patricia, "Introduction," in Half-way to
the Moon, p. viii.

3loc.
, cit., p. x.
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sooner or later comes the time to tell the t r u t h . F o r
in November of 1962 Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel about
one day in the life of an inmate in one of Stalin's
forced labor camps, One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich. was published, with the aid of personal
intervention by Khrushchev, in Novyi M i r . a journal which
Tvardovsky had sought to make a platform for progressive
writing of all kinds.

But the massive public response

to this "unlacquered" account of the camps raised too
many questions concerning the post-Stalin bureaucracy's
responsibility for Stalinism.

The stirring undoubtedly

caused the conservative political-bureaucratic party
establishment to panic.

Khrushchev, his position under

mined by his "adventurism" in the Caribbean and in
domestic cultural affairs, attempted to reassert himself
as a preservationist of ideological purity by castigating
mildly modernist artists during a visit to an exhibition
of non-representational art at Moscow's Manezh Hall.

By

1963 he was describing domestic literary affairs in the
following manner:

"It is said that periodicals and

publishing houses are being flooded with manuscripts
about the life of people in deportation, prisons and
2
camps. This is a very dangerous theme."

^ibid.
^ibid.
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In conclusion, it can be said that during the
period 1953 through 1963 the liberal intelligentsia
(democrats) moved from confusion after Stalin's death
to overt action, thus creating a model for the future
Democratic Movement.

As a result of the differences

between Stalin's camps, where critics and non-critics
alike were imprisoned, and Khrushchev's camps, where
genuine critics of the regime were all gathered together
as "politicals" and provided an opportunity to work out
differences and agree on some future common action,
life-long friendships and loyalties which provided
channels of information and cooperation were spread
all over the Soviet Union.^

Furthermore, there began

to develop a cooperation between the younger dissidents
and representatives of the older generation.
The Choice of the Court as a
Political Instrument
Khrushchev's downfall on 14 October 1964 left the
democrats of the Soviet Union confused.

They were aware

^In. "Some Aspects of the History and Ideational
Development of the Dissident Movement in the Post-Stalin
Soviet Union," Pospielovsky makes a case for the
difference between the camps of Stalin and Khrushchev.
He is convinced that the camps of the Khrushchev period
became "melting pots" of the civic and political elite
of the Soviet Union, where animosities and antagonisms
between various critics of the regime began to be
eradicated.
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of the fact that it was Khrushchev who first opened the
floodgates of denunciation against Stalin, and yet,
disappointment with his promises and fear that he was
building a cult of his own personality caused them to
feel not overly regretful about Khrushchev's downfall.
Furthermore, things like the post-Khrushchev press
attacks against Lysenko and conservative playwright
A. Sofronov helped quiet the initial misgivings of the
democrats.

"On November 30 Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Bella

Akhmadulina and Rimma Kazakova...gave a poetry reading
to some 1800 people in the Moscow Conservatory, the
first such large reading by the liberal poets since the
events of 1962-63.

In late December, 'Poetry Day' saw

most of the liberal poets reading to small audiences."^
And in the early spring of 1965 "...a new collection of
Boris Pasternak's poetry was assigned to the press with
an introduction by the devoted Pasternak scholar—
2
Andrei Siniavski."
The most unusual development was the degree
to which young intellectuals and students were
expressing themselves openly— aggressively
showing, as one Soviet writer said, that they
were the first Soviet generation "without the
habit of fear." On April 14, 1965, a young

^"McClure, Timothy, "The Cultural Scene: The
Politics of Soviet Culture, 1964-1967." Problems of
Communism. (March/April 1967), p. 29.
2
loc. cit., p. 33.
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organization of dissident poets, the Smoqisti.
inarched from Maiakovski Square to the Writers'
Union club on Herzen Street, where they stood
blocking traffic and reciting their unorthodox
verse, to the utter amazement of Union offi
cials who had neither seen nor heard of an
unauthorized demonstration of Soviet citizens
in Moscow for years. Another remarkable occur
rence took place in the spring at a large
organized student meeting at Moscow University;
a younger speaker who was ostensibly on the
platform to condemn "Western bourgeois cynicism"
for invoking the statute of limitations on Nazi
war criminals in West Germany, shocked his
audience by proclaiming that the real cynics
were the leaders of the Soviet Union, who had
revealed the horrible crimes of the Stalin era
but had as yet failed to bring any of the per
petrators to trial.
It was also in the spring of 1965 that the
eminent Ilia Ehrenburg, speaking to a group of
writers at Moscow's Foreign Literature Library,
declared that the time had passed when writers
should describe how they suffered under Stalin
— that they should now begin examining the
1
question of "how Stalinism could have happened."
These developments, however, were occurring in
the partial vacuum created by the turnover in the top
leadership.

Khrushchev's heirs were more concerned

"...with the more pressing problems of tidying up the
structural aberrations in the party, reassuring the
nation's bureaucrats that they could rule better and
more securely without that 1subjectivist' Khrushchev,
and mending fences with friends in the Communist
2
movement."
By mid-1965, a conservative cultural policy

^ibid.
2
loc. cit., p. 29.
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began to emerge from "...a general effort by the regime
to reassert discipline and respect for authority— most
notably party and police authority— in the society at
large."1

Action against the democrats being perceived

as necessary because of the breakdown of controls over
the intelligentsia and, as a result, the spread of
dissident activity.
In dealing with recalcitrant members of the intelli
gentsia, the regime faced a choice of weapons which
ranged from a return to the mass terror of the Stalinist
tradition to a policy of "selective repression."

Now

according to some accounts there were indeed "...some
dissidents who were whisked away without the benefit of
2
the legal procedures that people had come to expect."
However, the regime had to treat those dissidents whose
reputations among liberal intellectuals abroad and/or
at home was great in a manner which would preclude
hostile reaction abroad and opposition at home.

Thus,

the liberal writers Andrei Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel,
whose works, under their respective pen names of Abram
Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak, had for several years been
smuggled out of the country and published through
foreign outlets without the regime's authorization,

1loc. cit., p. 36.
2
Turner, op. cit., p. 118.

m
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were singled out for special treatment.

What followed

has come to be regarded as the beginning of the Demo
cratic Movement, and the case itself ranks with the death
of Stalin and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech in
its affect on Soviet society.
Siniavsky and Daniel were tried not for publishing
works abroad without official permission, but for socalled "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

For as

Harvard Law Professor Harold J. Berman has observed:
It is not a crime under Soviet law to send a
manuscript abroad for publication without
official permission, although it may be a dis
ciplinary offense, punishable by an administrative
fine, if the regulations of the organization for
which the writer works require the granting of
such permission. In Soviet history at least half
a dozen other writers have privately sent out
manuscripts for publication abroad. A recent
example is that of Evgeny Evtushenko's "A Pre
cocious Autobiography." Evtushenko was publicly
reprimanded, but there was no suggestion of
bringing criminal charges against him.l
The State prosecuted Siniavsky and Daniel for violations
punishable under Section 1 of Article 70 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
(R.S.F.S.R.).

That Article reads as follows:

Agitation or propaganda carried on for the
purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet
authority or of committing particular, espe
cially dangerous crimes against the state, or
circulating for the same purpose slanderous

^Berman, Harold J . , "The Writer & Soviet Law."
The New Leader. (14 February 1966), p. 13.
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fabrications which defame the Soviet state and
social system, or circulating or preparing or
keeping, for the same purpose, literature of
such content, shall be punished by deprivation
of freedom for a term of six months to seven
years, with or without additional exile for a
term of two to five years, or exile for a term
of two to five years.1
The language of this provision, entitled "Anti-Soviet
propaganda and agitation," is extremely vague in that
"anti-Soviet" and "slanderous fabrications which defame
the Soviet state and social system" could be construed
to include anything political authority chooses.
Curiously enough, the regime appears to have not
expected the universal storm of protest which the ar
rest, trial, and severe sentencing of the two writers
aroused.

In the West, even the reactions of the Com2
munist Parties were negative.
And although there was
no immediate reaction to the Fall 1965 arrest of
Siniavsky and Daniel in the Soviet Union due to the
regime's delay of its announcement, opposition at home

^ibid.
2
The reaction of H. C. Hermansson (head of the
Swedish Communist Party), -for example, was:
"I main
tain that ideas must be fought with ideas and not by
the police and courts." (As it appeared in Abraham
Brumberg, "Traitors in the Dock," Problems of Communism
March/April, 1966, p. 76.) The reaction of John Gollan
General Secretary of the British Communist Party, was:
"Justice should not only be done but should be seen to
be done. Unfortunately this cannot be said in the case
'of this trial."
(As it appeared in Brumberg, ibid.)
Similar comments appeared in L'Humanite (Paris) and
L'Unita (Rome).
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finally surfaced in the form of demonstratians which
occurred in December.

On 5 December 1965 a dissident

youth movement named SMOG held a public demonstration in
which some 100-200 students and other persons partici
pated.^- The demonstration had been announced the night
before in a leaflet entitled "A Civic Appeal" which was
distributed at the University of Moscow.

2

On December 11,

^"See Pospielovsky, op. cit., p. 31. See also
Gaucher, op. cit., p. 505.
2
A translation of the leaflet announcing the
demonstration follows:
Several months back, two citizens, writers
A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel, were arrested by
agents of the KGB. In this case there is cause
to fear a violation of the law on conducting
open court proceedings. It is widely known that
any kind of illegality is possible behind closed
doors and that the violation of the law on open
proceedings is in itself an act of lawlessness.
It is incredible that the creativity of writers
can constitute a crime against the State.
In the past, the lawlessness of those in
authority has cost millions of Soviet citizens
their lives and freedom. The bloody past calls
us to be watchful of what's going on at the
present moment. It is easier to sacrifice the
peace of a single day than to suffer for years
the effects of tyranny not checked in time.
Citizens have the means to fight the arbi
trariness of the courts— by "Open Public Meet
ings"— during which those gathered together
pronounce a solitary slogan "We demand an open
hearing for... (followed by the name of the
accused) or display corresponding placards. Any
cries or slogans which overstep the limits of
the strictest interpretation of the law would
undoubtedly be harmful and possibly even pro
vocative and must be stopped short by the
participants themselves. During the meeting
the strictest observation of order is imperative.
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Having informed the authorities of the goals of
the meeting, at the first demand to disperse, we
must do just that.
You are invited to an open public meeting
that will be held December 5 at 6 p.m. near the
statue of the Poet in the public garden of
Pushkin Square.
Bring two others with you who are also con
cerned about the contents of this address.
The demonstration was followed by another leaflet, a
translation of which follows:
December 5, 1965, at Pushkin Square in
Moscow there was a demonstration in support of
demands for an open hearing in the case of
writers A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel.
In violation of the most elementary demo
cratic principles the authorities forcibly broke
up the demonstration.
Under the pressure of the authorities the
administration of the department of the humani
ties of Moscow State University carried on an
infamous campaign of reprisals against the
students, who happened to be in Pushkin Square
at the time of the demonstration.
Having made short shrift of the youth by
means of servile party-administrative official
dom, the authorities try to cover up the
repressive measures they employed. But the
ferocity of the servile dogs only emphasizes
the disposition of the higher-ups who taught
them their tricks.
Answering a question about the arrest of
Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel at a press conference
on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel
Prize M. Sholokov said, "It is necessary to
write honestly and to look honestly straight in
the eyes of the authorities, and not to fight
for popularity by publishing in the West....'1
This Sholokhov, who has played along with the
authorities, into whose eyes does he recommend
that we look? Into the eyes of depraved politi
cal beasts. In the eyes of the brown-nosing
party-administrative careerists or in the eyes
of pseudo-official demagogues and charlatans?
And it is altogether strange that M. Sholokhov
has for so long not been able to discern on the
physiognomy of "his" political, authorities a pair
of gleaming policeman's brass buttons instead
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several hundred students of the Gorki Institute of
World Literature, in Moscow, where Siniavsky had been
teaching, staged a demonstration in behalf of the two
arrested writers."1

Furthermore, by December,

of eyes. And, in our opinion, it's amazing
that the Nobel Prize for 1965 was awarded to
a man with the thinking capacity of a moral
ist from a semi-official propaganda team and
to that man who can "honestly" look through
rose-colored glasses into the inhuman eyes of
imposters.
In conjunction with the breaking up of
the demonstration and the ensuring repressive
measures against youthful students, the ques
tion arises: who is responsible for sanction
ing these violations of constitutional
freedoms? It's obvious— no onei It's obvious
the authorities do not consider it really
necessary to preserve the proclaimed consti
tutional freedoms, but on the contrary, are
inclined to support acts of outrage against
democracy and encourage the manifestation of
direct and indirect violence against the
individual.
Here it would be appropriate to remember
the words of Palmiro Tolyatti from his Memoirs:
"The problem that attracts the most attention,
— this applies both to the Soviet Union and
to other socialist countries— is, however, the
problem of overcoming a regime, introduced by
Stalin, which restricts and suppresses demo
cracy and personal freedoms."
We call on you to watchfulness and
resistance. We call on you to look honestly
in the eyes of your conscience and not to
choke its natural inclinations in the noose of
compromise. We call on you to look into the
depths of your very self, and if you see a
pitiful swindler, who has already lost his
head, but quakes with fear for each hair on
that head, then we ask you not to deceive
yourself.
^Brumberg, op. cit., n. 4, p. 72.
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Alexander Ginzburg had already foreseen the strategy of
appealing to civil rights in the attempt to win literary
freedom.

For he wrote a letter to Kosygin concerning

Article 19 of the "Universal Declaration of the Rights
of Man" (adopted by the United Nations and ratified in
1948 by the Soviet Union), which reads as follows:
"Every person has the right to freedom of opinion and to
its free expression; this right includes the freedom of
adhering without let or hindrance to one's own opinions,
and the freedom to seek, receive and distribute informa
tion and ideas by any means whatsoever and independently
of state frontiers."

In his letter, Ginzburg asks,

"Are not these words directly relevant to the case of
Sinyavsky and Daniel?"^
From the first time the Soviet public learned of
the arrest of Siniavsky and Daniel (via the article
"The Turncoats" by Dmitri Eremen in the January 13, 1966
issue of Izvestia) until the reading of the sentence,
the Soviet press cranked out material which demonstrated
the two writers as prejudged.

The guilt of the two

writers, as Ermen viewed it in that first article, was
anything but in doubt:

As translated in Hayward, Max, On Trial: The
Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak."
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967, p. 278.
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Sinyavsky and Daniel began in a small way:
they exchanged honesty for unscrupulousness;
literary activity as understood by Soviet
people for double-dealing; a sincere attitude
to life for nihilism, carping behind people's
backs and "picking to pieces" those around them.
Once started on these petty tricks they did not
stop there. They continued their downward
course. In the end they sank so low as to
commit crimes against the Soviet system. In
so doing they placed themselves beyond the pale
of our literature and the community of Soviet
people. From petty nastiness to major .
treachery— this was the course they ran.
The liberal intelligentsia reacted to these attacks with
letters of protest to the editors of those papers pub
lishing attacks on the two writers, but nothing favor
able to either Siniavsky or Daniel was even commented
on beyond the simple editorial note in Izvestia saying
that the paper received "numerous letters of comment."
Izvestia did, however, publish three letters which de
nounced both Siniavsky and Daniel in violent language.
Despite the unbridled cynicism of the Soviet press,
Siniavsky and Daniel caused others to begin to have
difficulties in matters of faith.

For whatever con

cessions Siniavsky and Daniel may have been induced to
make during the secret preliminary interrogation, the
masterly defense which they conducted on their own behalf
left the regime in the position of prohibiting the use
of paradoxical ideas and hyperbolic images as artistic

^loc. cit., p. 218.
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devices.

The two writers denied, again and again, that

their intention was political (Soviet jurists and Soviet
courts had previously interpreted Article 70 "...to re
quire proof that the accused understood the anti-Soviet
character of the utterances he made and desired to cause
harm to the Soviet state."^) rather than artistic— as
illustrated, for instance, by the following exchange
between the prosecutor, Daniel, and the judge:
PROSECUTOR:

DANIEL:

PROSECUTOR:

DANIEL:

JUDGE:

(reading from the Glavlit report):
"In the author's view, the Soviet
people blindly follow the party
leadership." How would you judge
your story in the light of this?
I didn't mean to say anything so
harsh. To some extent I agree with
the idea that the political initiative
of the masses...I don't believe in
it very much. I consider the masses
politically passive.
In other words, if a "Public Murder
Day" were proclaimed, you would expect
everyone simply to rush off to kill
as they were told?
No, I don't say that in the story.
The "Public Murder Day" is a literary
device, chosen as a way of studying
people's reactions.
There is something I want to clear up.
Just imagine a communal apartment
where Ivanova is having a quarrel
with Sidorova. If Ivanova were to
write that there is a certain lady
who is making life difficult for
another lady, then it would be an

^"Berman, op. cit., p. 13.
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innuendo, a figure of speech. But
if she were to write that Sidova was
throwing garbage into her soup,
then we would have something like a
libel, slander or something else sub
ject to legal proceedings. You were,
after all, writing about the Soviet
Government, not about ancient Babylon,
but about a specific government that
proclaimed a "Public Murder Day," and
you name the date— August 10, 1960.
Is that a device or outright slander?
DANIEL:

JUDGE:

DANIEL:

Let me just use your example. If
Ivanova were to write that Sidorova
literally flies about on a broom
stick or turns herself into an animal,
that would be a literary device, not
slander. I took an obviously fan
tastic situation.
But here is what B. Filippov wrote:
"Can we say that what Arzhak
describes is all that far removed
from reality?" So, you see, Daniel,
it is not just a literary device,
is it?
It is a literary device.1

And because all their attempts to assert the principle
of artistic freedom were frustrated, sixty-three members
of the Union of Writers of the U.S.S.R., fearful that
the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical
works might create an extremely dangerous precedent,
signed a petition shortly after the trial which not only
argued this, but also stated that the signers believed
that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of

1Hayward, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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the malicious intent on the part of Siniavsky and Daniel
which had been interpreted as being necessary for convic
tion under Article 70.^
Intellectual Dissent Becomes
a Quest for Civil Rights
Even after Siniavsky and Daniel were sentenced to
seven and five years hard labor respectively, the demo
crats continued to fight back.

Regarding the Siniavsky-

Daniel trial as unjust and public information concerning
the trial as inadequate, Alexander Ginzburg edited a
collection of documents on the case and Yury Galanskov
2
issued a "samizdat" magazine called Phoenix 1966.
which contained an open letter by him harshly condemning
Mikhail Sholokhov for siding with the authorities on
the Siniavsky-Daniel case.

^loc. cit., p. 284. The text of the letter and
the names of those who signed it appear on pp. 284-86.
2
The word samizdat (from sam + izdat = self +
publishing) has come to mean different things to vary
ing observers. Inside the Soviet Union, the element
of reproducing and distributing foreign or domestic
printed and broadcast material through an underground
network appears to be critical.
In the West, however,
samizdat has generally come_to mean any writing from
inside the U.S.S.R. which is not publishable there.
It includes many themes and subjects, but is only one
indication of the ferment which has developed in the
Soviet Union. Samizdat is not a synonym for the
ferment itself, which is much broader and more complex.
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Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolsky, Vera Lashkova, and
P. Radziyevsky were arrested on January 17-19, 1967.

On

January 22 a group of about forty democrats^" demonstrated
in Pushkin Square in Moscow, demanding the release of
those arrested.

The demonstration was broken up by the

police and a number of demonstrators arrested.

Ginzburg

was arrested the day after the demonstration in Pushkin
Square and was tried with Galanskov, Dobrovolsky, and
Lashkova (Radziyevsky having been released after he gave
the KGB the evidence they required).

The Pushkin Square

demonstrators were tried in February 1967, but the
.Ginzburg-Galanskov trial did not occur until January 1968.
The trials resulting from the demonstration in
Pushkin Square were different from the Siniavsky-Daniel
trial.

The Siniavsky-Daniel trial was essentially con

cerned with literary freedom, but those demonstrating in
Pushkin Square were also demanding the revision of Arti
cles 70 and 190 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.
which they regarded as anti-constitutional.

This was an

important step in the development of the Democratic
Movement in that it involved an evolution from a cam
paign for legality to a demand that the system observe

^"Litvinov, Pavel, The Trial of the Four: A Collec
tion of Materials on the Case of Galanskov. Ginzburg,
Dobrovolsky. and Lashkova. 1967-68. New York: The Viking
Press, 1972, p. 18.
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its legal foundations.

That the Pushkin Square

demonstrators were not the only democrats to express
concern for the institutionalization of civil rights
and greater freedoms of e x p r e s s i o n w a s indicative of
apprehension over signs of Stalin's rehabilitation by
the post-Khrushchev leadership.
Although the trials resulting from the demon
stration in Pushkin Square were officially described
as "hearings in open court," except for a handful of
relatives of the accused, the "public" consisted of
pre-selected persons.

The Soviet press also stated

that the accused had confessed their crimes, yet a
different story was communicated to Western sources by
Pavel Litvinov, the grandson of the late Maxim Litvinov,
who negotiated the 1933 American recognition of Soviet
Russia.

Litvinov disclosed that the defendant Vladimir

Bukovsky pleaded not guilty and defended his rights
under the Soviet constitution to demonstrate publicly.
Bukovsky's final statement before receiving the verdict
and sentence include the following:

^"According to Pospielovsky, op. cit., the com
poser Shestokovich and the leading scientists Sakharov,
Zeldovich, Astaurov, B. Ginzburg, Knuniants, Migdal,
Leontovich, Tamm, and Engelhardt all signed an appeal
to the R.S.F.S.R. along with other scholars, artists,
and writers. Iesenin-Volpin, he says, sent a separate
letter of protest.
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...I have before me the text of our Constitution:
"In the interests of the workers and in order to
strengthen the Socialist System, the citizens of
the USSR are guaranteed by law...freedom to march
and to demonstrate in the streets." Why was this
article put in? To legalize the demonstrations
of October and May Day? But that wasn't necessary
— everybody knows that if the Government has
organized a demonstration, nobody is going to
break it up. What is the use of freedom to
demonstrate "for" if we can't demonstrate
"against"? We know that protest demonstrations
are a powerful weapon in the hands of the workers
and that the right to hold than exists in every
democracy. And where is the right denied? Here
is Pravda of the 19th of August— a news item from
Paris says that May Day demonstrators are being
tried in Madrid. They were tried under a new
law: it had recently been passed in Spain and
it imposes terms of eighteen months to three
years in prison for taking part in a demonstra
tion. Note the touching unanimity of Fascist and
Soviet law.
...there is no substance in the
charge against u s , we have not committed any
crime. I absolutely don’t repent of having
organized the demonstration. I believe it has
done its job and, when I am free again, I shall
organize other demonstrations— always, of course,
like this one, in perfect conformity with the
law.1
Thus, Bukovsky brought the Soviet Government to task for
its own unbridled cynicism.

His rejection of the Lenin

ist conception of freedom demonstrated that dissent had
gone beyond the critique of Stalinism advanced by the
Marxist oppositionists of the 1930's.

While they re

garded Stalinism as a phenomenon not imminent in a
single-party state with a totally planned economy,

^Litvinov, Pavel, The Demonstration in Pushkin
Square. Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1969, pp. 116-27.
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democrats now came to perceive the phenomenon of Stalin
ism as grounded in the Soviet system and its ideology.^It was the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, however, that
resulted in the samizdat movement expanding into the
loose but recognizable Democratic Movement.

Major-

General Piotr Grigorenko, who had been a lecturer at
Frunze Military Academy in Moscow until he became active
in various protest movements and was consequently dis
missed and sent to the special psychiatric prison called
2
Serbsky Institute, wrote the members of the Politburo
and stated that the

Soviet dissidents have come to reject even MarxismLeninism. Pospielovsky, op. cit., states that Chronicle
of Current Events No. 12 mentions that in 1969 MajorGeneral Grigorenko told his prison psychiatrist in
Moscow that he would no longer appeal for a return to
Leninism as he had done earlier. Pospielovsky goes on
to say that friends of Grigorenko and his family confirm
that he has been "cured" of Marxism-Leninism. Also, in
an interview with Newsweek1s Moscow bureau chief Jay
Axelbank, Andrei Sakharov stated, "...I have modified my
beliefs. I would no longer label myself a socialist. I
am not a Marxist-Leninist or a Communist. I would call
myself a liberal."
(Newsweek. 13 November 1972, p. 55.)
Thus, those dissidents who carried on their struggle
against Stalinism and neo-Stalinism under the illusory
banner of Leninism have come to recognize the bankruptcy
of the myth about the democratic spirit and tolerance of
"Leninist Legality." See Pospielovsky, Dimitri, "The
Diary of Ekaterina Olitskaia: A Social Revolutionary
Recalls the Times of Leninist Terror." Radio Liberty
Research Paper No. 39. New York: Radio Liberty Com
mittee, 1970.
2
See Reddaway, Peter, Uncensored Russia: Protest
and Dissent in the Soviet Union. New York: American
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International Human Rights Year began in the
U.S.S.R. with an unprecedented violation of
human rights. At this very time, our mother
land has been nailed to a pillory of shame in
the eyes of all the world as well as of Com
munist society. This was done by official
representatives of the government through a
barbaric trial organized by organs of the KGB.
During the trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg,
Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova...1, like many other
citizens of Moscow...felt— with unusual bitter
ness— the injustice and shame this trial was
bringing upon our country.1
Pyotr Yakir, the son of the ..late Soviet Army Com
mander Ion Yakir (who was executed in 1937 during the
Stalin purges) affixed his signature to the bottom of a
letter admonishing "public figures in science, culture,
and the arts."

The open letter ended with the following

two sentences:

"Each time you are silent, the way is

further paved for another trial.

Little by little,

because of your silent consent, there may come upon us
2
a new Nineteen Thirty-Seven."

Heritage Press, 1972, pp. 127-29; Abuse of Psychiatry for
Political Repression in the Soviet Union. Hearing before
the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act And Other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United
States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
September 26, 1972, pp. 47-107.
^As translated in Brumberg, Abraham, JCn Quest of
Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today.
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970, p. 152.

2
As translated in Litvinov, op. cit., p. 246. For
a different translation of this letter, see loc. cit.,
pp. 157-61.
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The most famous protest against the GinzburgGalanskov trial, of course, was the "Open Letter to
World Public Opinion" by Larisa Daniel (wife of Yuli
Daniel) and Pavel Litvinov.

The following is an excerpt

We appeal to world public opinion and, in the
first place, to Soviet public opinion. We
appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive
and who has sufficient courage:
Demand public condemnation of the shame
ful trial and the punishment of those guilty
of perpetrating it i
Demand the release of the accused from
arrest!
Demand a new trial in conformity with all
legal norms and in the presence of interna
tional observers!
Citizens of our country I This trial is a
stain on the honor of our state and on the
conscience of every one of us. You yourselves
elected this court and these judges— demand
that they be deprived of the posts that they
have abused. Today it is not only the fate of
the...accused that is at stake— their trial is
no better than the celebrated trials of the
1930's which involved us in so much shame and
so much bloodshed that we still have not
recovered from them.
We address this appeal to the Western
progressive press and ask that it be published
and broadcast by radio as soon as possible.
We are not sending this request^to Soviet news
papers, because that is futile.
The most important result of the Galanskov-Ginzburg
trial, however, was the development of a loose but recog
nizable civil rights movement with— from April 1968— its
own de facto organ, The Chronicle of Current Events.

As translated in Brumberg, loc. cit., p. 104. For
a different translation of this letter, see Litvinov,
loc. cit., pp. 225-27.
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The material contained in the first issue of The
Chronicle revealed the birth of a movement in two senses.
For as Reddaway^ has observed,
first, groups and individuals in such farflung places as Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk,
Latvia, the Ukraine and elsewhere, all— in an
unprecedented fashion— made simultaneous and
similar protests against a single event in
Moscow. Second, these protests then found
their way to a central point, were "processed"
there, then redistributed as the Chronicle.
The different groups thus got to know about
each other and new links could more easily be
established.
The Chronicle has no forebearers in Russian history
in that it regards law as a means of securing civil and
economic freedom.

In providing a platform for any

views of generally democratic tendency, it demonstrates
a remarkable degree of tolerance and a lack of dogma
tism.

Concerning its production and distribution, issue

No. 5 stated that
the Chronicle is in no sense an illegal publi
cation, and the difficult conditions in which
it is produced are created by the peculiar
notions about law and freedom of information
which, in the course of long years, have be
come established in certain Soviet organizations.
For this reason the Chronicle cannot, like any
other journal, give its postal address on the
last page. Nevertheless, anybody who is inter
ested in seeing that the Soviet public is
informed about what goes on in the country,
may easily pass on information to the editors
of the Chronicle. Simply tell it to the person
from whom you received the Chronicle. and he

^Reddaway, op. cit., p. 72.
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will tell the person from whom he received the
Chronicle. and so on. But do not try to trace
back the whole chain of communication yourself,
or else you will be taken for a police
informer.1
The Formal Coordination of
Civil Rights Activities
In May of 1969, a group of democrats

2

organized the

Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the
U.S.S.R.

The Action Group addressed several appeals to

the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, requesting that it
investigate the violation of basic human rights in the
Soviet Union.

Mr. U Thant, however, instructed that all

petitions were to be refused, and soon the leading per
sonalities of the Action Group found themselves either
in prison camps or prison mental hospitals.
Then in November of 1970, Andrei Sakharov formed,
with his physicist colleagues Valery Chalidze and Andrei
Tverdokhlebov, a Committee on Human Rights to study
problems of human rights and to aid the authorities in

^loc. cit., p. 54.
2
loc. cit., pp. 150-70. Also, see Pospielovsky,
"Some Aspects of the History and Ideational Develop
ment of the Post-Stalin Soviet Union," pp. 42-43. The
fifteen organizers, mostly professional men and women,
represented Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and the
exiled Crimean Tatars of Central Asia. The Action
Group's first protest letter was signed by these
members and 39 supporters.
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introducing desirable reforms.

Thus, when on 10 Decem

ber 1970 Alexander Solzhenitsyn demonstrated his
responsibility toward the U. N. Human Rights Day by
agreeing to his election as a corresponding member,
there was created a situation in which a formal Soviet
dissident organization could boast of including as
members both the Soviet Union's foremost writer as well
as one of its foremost scientists.
The Committee on Human Rights disseminated its
ideas of legality through the journal Social Problems.
which was edited by Chalidze.

In July of 1970, the

Committee addressed an appeal to the 5th World Psy
chiatric Congress in Mexico, requesting that it
investigate the Soviet use of psychiatry for political
repression.

Again, the West let the Soviet Democrats

down; the Psychiatric Congress simply ignored the issue
of Soviet abuse of psychiatry.
As detente with the West developed, the pressure on
the Democratic Movement increased.

Beginning in late

1971, Criminal Case Number 24 was executed by the Com
mittee for State Security with the expressed purpose of
preventing The Chronicle of Current Events from con
tinuing publication.

Yet, The Chronicle continued

publication until October of 1972 (with issue number 27).
The August, 1973, conviction of Pyotr I. Yakir and
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Victor A. Krasin as authors and distributors of The
Chronicle and their public recantation in September
of 1973 appeared to assure the end of the publica
tion.^- The Democrats, however, bounced back by
creating a new organization, the Initiative Group for
2
the Defense of Human Rights.
Then, Valery Chalidze
was allowed to leave the Soviet Union and was stripped
of his citizenship after he was abroad in December of
1973.

In February of 1974 Solzenitsyn, himself, was

forcibly banished from the Soviet Union.

The Demo

crats retorted by resuming publication of The Chronicle
after an eighteen month suspension.

By 17 May 1974

the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st issues had made their
3
appearance.

See Shabad, Theodore, "Moscow Seizes Vocal
Advocates of More Civil Rights in Soviet," in The New
York Times, June 22, 1972; Shabad, "Soviet Says Two
Testify Freely," in The New York Times. August 29,
1973; Shabad, "Soviet Dissident Linked at Trial to an
Underground Publication," in The New York Times.
August 30, 1973; Shabad, "Soviet Asks Mild Terms at
Trial of 2 Dissidents," in The New York Times. Septem
ber 1, 1973; Shabad, "Soviet Dissidents Recent in
Public," in The New York Times. September 6, 1973;
and Shabad, "Soviet Dissidents and Confession," in
The New York Times. September 7, 1973.
2
"Protest in Russia Still Lives," in Intelligence
Digest. October 1973, p. 4.
3
Wren, Christopher S., "Dissident Periodical Is
Revived in Soviet," in The New York Times. May 13,
1974, p. 5; Wren, "Soviet Newsletter Marks Tatars'
Exile," in The New York Times. May 23, 1974.
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In contrast to the advocates of conspiratorial
action and force who have existed throughout the idea
tional development of the Democratic Movement in the
post-Stalin era, the ideational nature of the Action
Group, Committee, Initiative Group, and Chronicle is
essentially one of remaining within, and advocating
reform of, the legal system.

Recently, however, there

has been a loss of hope in a peaceful evolution of the
system under legalistic social pressure.

One sign of

this frustration has been the Samizdat publications
calling for a more organized and programmatic movement.
So, as the majority of Democrats radicalize their
thoughts and actions,1 a new type of organizational
structure can be expected.

Furthermore, as they in

creasingly concern themselves with basic popular and
progressive platforms more comprehensible for peasants
2
and workers instead of the present abstract ideas of

An example of the radicalization might possibly
be the 1 November 1973 attempt to hijack a Soviet
domestic airliner to Sweden. The attempt was conducted
by four youths and involved a ransom variously described
as half a million or a million dollars in U.S. currency.
See "Soviet Air Minister Oversees Foiling of Hijacking,"
in The New York Times. November 6, 1973.
2
In the Spring of 1972 Democrats circulated an
appeal calling on Soviet workers to demonstrate for
better living conditions and cited the success of
action taken by Polish workers. See Shabad, Theodore,
"Soviet Underground Urges Strikes to Raise Standards,"
in The New York Times. June 20, 1972.
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human rights, a broader base for the Democratic Movement
can be expected to be found.
Uniformity of Demands
for Systemic Change
If the Democratic Movement is to be regarded as a
true movement, it is essential to fix some of the points
at which the various streams of dissent in the Soviet
Union come together in order to provide evidence of some
sort of corroberation among its many tributaries.

These

points at which tolerance and cooperation occur are in
dicative of the fact that various streams of dissent in
the Soviet Union are beginning to understand the in
divisibility of freedom, thereby transforming themselves
into informally allied wings of the Democratic Movement.
Although the friendship of Aleksei Kosterin, the
champion of the Crimean Tatars, and General Grigorenko
provided an individual link between the Russian demo
crats and the Crimean Tatars, a February 1968 letter to
the Budapest conference of Communist and Workers' Parties
provided an important link-up.

The letter had been

signed by eleven Moscow democrats and one Crimean Tatar
from Uzbekistan.'*'

It included the following appeal:

^The letter and the names, occupations, and ad
dresses of those signing the appeal are found in
A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 1, 30 April
1968, as translated in Reddaway, op. cit., 86-88.
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"We also call your attention to the fact of discrimina
tion against small nations and the political persecution
of people who are struggling for national equality, all
this being particularly clear in the case of the
Crimean Tatars."^
On the 30th of March 1968, the Orthodox priest
Sergei Zheludkov linked Christians to the struggle of
the Democratic Movement in a letter to Pavel Litvinov,
supporting the "Open Letter to World Public Opinion" by
2
Litvinov and Larissa Daniel.
However, perhaps one of
the best examples of unity of cause between the main
stream Democratic Movement and religious dissent is the
Orthodox writer Anatoly Levitin (pen-name Krasnov).
According to the Chronicle.
during recent years Levitin-Krasnov has...
spoken out continually in defense of civil
rights, and in defense of people arrested
and sentenced on political charges. His

1loc. cit., p. 87.
2
See A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 5,
25 December 1968, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit.,
p. 329. The English and Russian text of this letter
appears in Karel van het Reve, editor, Dear Comrade:
Pavel Litvinov and the Voices of Soviet Citizens in
Dissent. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation,
1969, pp. 154-163. In a letter dated 9 May 1968,
Zheludkov also addressed the heads of various foreign
churches concerning the "...grievous situation of
political prisoners in the U.S.S.R. and calls on all
Christians, and particularly their spiritual leaders,
to speak up in their defense." (A Chronicle of Current
Events. Issue No. 5, 25 December 1968, as translated
in Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 329.
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signature stands at the foot of numerous
collective protests.... He is a member of
the Action Group for the Defense of Human
Rights in the Soviet Union. As a publicist
he has commented on the arrest of B. V.
Talantov and P. G. Grigorenko.*
The same issue also stated that
soon after Levitin1s arrest, a letter began
to circulate in samizdat. entitled "To Pub
lic Opinion in the Soviet Union and Abroad,"
signed by thirty-two Soviet citizens....
The letter says that A. E. Levitin "was
becoming more and more worried by problems
of civil freedom, since freedom is indivis
ible and there can be no religious freedom
if basic human rights are being trampled
upon. He was the first religious person in
our country in the post-Stalin years to af
firm this truth and to raise his voice in
defense of civil rights and of those who have
^
fallen victims in the fight for civil freedoms."
The event generally accepted as the birth of the
Democratic Movement in the Ukraine is the protest re
sulting from the trial and sentencing of twenty Ukrainian
intellectuals in 1965-1966.

The well-known book by

Vyacheslav Chomovil, published in English as The
Chomovil Papers. recorded and analyzed the fate of the
twenty intellectuals.

Another important work was Ivan

Dzuba's Internationalism or Russification. which
examined and challenged the official policy toward
nationalism.

Now while the issue of Ukrainian nationalism

A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 10,
31 October 1969, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit.,
pp. 323-24.
2

loc. cit., p. 325.
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is by no means new, the Democratic Movement in the
Ukraine has based its resistance on the liberal Soviet
and Ukrainian constitutions.

In April of 1968, 139

Ukrainian intellectuals and workers signed a letter
addressed to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and P o dgomy protesting
the infringement of the principles of legality and
publicity in the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial.^

That same

letter also attacked the conduct of trials in the
Ukraine as it stated:

"In the Ukraine, where viola

tions of democracy are magnified and aggravated by dis
tortions connected with the national question, the
symptoms of Stalinism are being manifested even more
2
overtly and grossly."
Thus, the Ukrainian democrats
demonstrated not only a knowledge of what was going on
in regards to Russian democrats, but also that they
felt that the Russian and Ukrainian struggles were in
no small way related.

Chomovil, furthermore, supported

the Moscow-based Action Group by signing its appeals to
3
the United Nations.
The association between the Jewish community of
the U.S.S.R. and the liberal intellectuals of the Soviet

^See Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 281. Also, see A
Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 1, 30 April 1968,
as translated by Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 78.
2
As translated in Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 281.
^Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 287.
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Union predates the birth of the Democratic Movement.
Edward Kuznetsov, one of the Jews who attempted to
hijack a Soviet plane to Sweden in 1970, had been a
dissenter and associate of Yuri Galanskov as early as
1961.1

Yevgeny Yevtushenko and Ivan Dzuba, furthermore,

had linked the Jewish struggle with that of other
Soviet citizens as early as 1966.

However, it wasn't

until 1968 that Jews began to speak out on civil and
human rights.

By 1970, Jews had become more militant

than any other wing of the Democratic Movement and,
despite the fact that many Jewish dissidents' overriding
goal has been Israel, there remain those who are
actively involved with the mainstream.

One example is

Boris Tsukerman, who authored a samizdat biography of
General Grigorenko and was a legal expert for Sakharov's
2
Human Rights Committee, and another is Julius Telesm,
who signed the Action Group's appeals to the United

^loc. cit., p. 318. Also, see Thorne, Ludmilla,
"The Democratic Movement and Samazdat as Forces Eroding
Traditional National, Ethnic, and Religious Hostilities
in the Soviet Union." A paper presented at the Tenth
Anniversary (11th Annual) Central Slavic Conference,
held 17-18 November 1972 at William Jewell College,
Liberty, Missouri, p. 22.
2
See A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 8,
30 June 1969, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit.,
p. 136. Also, see Thorne, ibid. Tsukerman was allowed
to leave for Israel in January of 1971.
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Nations and compiled a samizdat anthology of defiant
court speeches by defendants in political trials.^"
The mainstream of the Democratic Movement has from
the start attempted to discourage and erode traditional
national, ethnic, and religious hostilities.

The

Chronicle of Current Events. which does not claim to
represent a multi-national group nor speak for even the
mainstream of the movement, has concerned itself.with
all national, religious, and ethnic dissent in terms of
the U.S. Declaration of Human Rights.

In doing so, it

has contributed immensely to the discouragement and
erosion of these types of traditional hostilities.
Furthermore, the membership of the Action Group for the
Defense of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. also indicates
that a community of interests are represented:

among

its original members were two Ukrainians and a Crimean
2
Tatar.
As for the Committee on Human Rights, it has
taken up the legal cause of Georgians, Tatars, and
Jews, as well as Russians.^

Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 312. Also, see A Chronicle
of Current Events, No. 17, 31 December 1970, translated
by Amnesty International Publications. London, April
1971, p. 90. Telesin left for Israel 6 May 1970.
2
See Thorne, op. cit., p. 28.
^Sakharov had been, at first, permitted to attend
the trials of dissidents. This "privilege" was later
revoked, and on 15 February 1971 Committee members
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As can be seen, then, the Democratic Movement,
though a complex and ramified movement, has discovered
that "inasmuch as the Soviet leadership stands in the
way of the fulfillment of the diverse specific goals
of its components, they all have a common anti-establish
ment interest and would benefit from democratic rights
and freedom."'1’ Though distinct from each other, they
have articulated systemic changes which would prohibit
authorities from avoiding their obligation to observe
the basic human rights referred to in the present
Soviet constitution.

In searching for the presence of

uniformities in the articulations of the Democratic
Movement, the Radio Liberty Research Department Refer
ence Handbook Number 82, A Guide to Proposals for
2
Systemic Change in the USSR Offered by Soviet Citizens.

Chalidze and Tvyordokhlebov were summoned to the Depart
ment of General Surveillance of the Moscow Procuracy
and informed "...that the existence of the Committee...
was an infringement of the law...." (A Chronicle of
Current Events. Issue No. 18, 5 March 1971, translated
by Amnesty International Publications, op. cit., p. 128.
^ a t z , Zev, "Soviet Dissenters and Social Structure
in the USSR," the second in a series of seven papers
which constitute the narrative segment of a research
project on "The Sociology of Soviet Audiences" conducted
under contract between the U.S. Information Agency and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge: M.I.T.
Center for International Studies, December 1971, p. 24.
2
von Doemmmg, Gerd R . , "A Guide to Proposals for
Systemic Change in the USSR Offered by Soviet Citizens."
Radio Liberty Research Department Reference Handbook No.
82, New York: Radio Liberty Committee, August 1971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
can prove to be of immense value.

The handbook ascer

tains and collates some of the demands for political,
economic, social, and cultural changes.
Political demands
In observing the Democrats' political demands, it
is evident that they perceive the necessity for what
the American President James Madison called "auxiliary
precautions."

Owing to the experience of Stalinism,

they hope to prevent the government from abusing its
power and any one group from manipulating the government
and tyrannizing the population.

The first step would be

the dividing of constitutional authority among legis
lative, executive, and judicial branches of a national
government that would be independent of Communist Party
control.^
Beyond the recognized need for a constitution
which serves as a supreme and binding law that both
2
grants and limits powers, the democrats are agreed that
the civil and political rights of man must be guaran
teed.

For most democrats believe that government by

the people is based on the individual's right to question
and campaign openly against it and, therefore, advocate

^loc. cit., pp. 3, 5-7, 10, and 19.
^loc. cit., pp. 3, 5, 7, and 17-19.
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that specific freedoms be guaranteed all citizens by
law.

For Democrats, a basic charter of liberties

should include freedom of r e l i g i o n t h e freedom of
3
the freedom of the press, and the right of
4
the people to assemble and to petition the government
speech,

2

for redress of grievances.^
Another step by which the Democrats would hope to
lessen the risk of monopoly of political power is
through a federal form of government.

g

True federalism

would institutionalize the Democrats' suspicion of con
centrated power as represented by Moscow.

It would

also go a long ways toward providing the self-determina
tion that the Soviet nationalities policy has denied.
For the colonial aggrandizement of the Russian empire
and the Russification policy of the Soviet Union have
made federalism crucial to the resolution of the
nationalities problem in the Soviet Union.^

1loc. cit., pp. 19, and 41-44.
loc. cit., p. 19.
loc. cit., pp. 19, and 49-51.

41
loc. cit., p. 19.
5ibid 6-loc.
,
cit., pp. 8-9 , and 11.
7.
loc. cit., pp. 14, and 25-28.
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Perhaps because of the experiences of the Soviet
populace and the history of the land which they people,
Soviet Democrats would intend for the Supreme Soviet
to hold the commanding position in the government of
the U.S.S.R.'*'

Executive power would be exercised by

the Council of Ministers, which would be subjected to
the laws of the country as established by the Supreme
2
Soviet.
The fear of abuse of executive power is so
strong among Soviet Democrats that some have proposed
that the judicial branch of government be responsible
to the Supreme Soviet for policing the executive branch
excesses.

3

The underpinning of the systemic changes,

as the Democrats perceive it, would be truly democratic
elections

4

based upon a multi-party system.

5

Economic demands
The Soviet Democrats recognize the validity of the
arguments concerning the importance of economic demo
cracy.

However, they also recognize the dangers to

^loc. cit., pp. 5-7.
^ibid.
^loc. cit., p. 7.
4
Katz, op. cit., p. 24.
^von Doemming, op. cit., p. 10.
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democracy inherent in a completely centralized system
of State ownership.^- They have advocated, therefore,
a three-tiered economy combining public and private
2
ownership.
The system proposed calls for the estab
lishment of three types of ownership— public, collective,
and private.

All would function in free competition

with each other,

3

regulated only by supply and demand.

4

National income hopefully becoming distributed more
equitably and, thereby, removing some of the vast
economic differences between the ruling elite and the
ordinary Soviet citizen.5
Industrial democracy itself becomes a concern of
the Democrats indicating their awareness concerning
State capitalism.
ownership

6

The Democrats call for true public

and industrial democracy.

7

They have also

identified the need for re-proletarianizing the trade
unions by freeing them from CPSU and government control

^loc. cit., pp. 33
^loc. cit., P- 33.
3ibid •
^ibid •
loc. cit., P- 37.
^loc. cit., P- 34.
7loc. cit., P* 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

so that they might more truly represent their members'
interests.*
Soviet Democrats have also insisted upon the
"

democratization of the agricultural sector.

2

Their

concern here is to increase the independence of the
individual collective farm worker, as well as to in
crease his economic well-being.3

The concept is to

stress democratic attitudes in the hope of fostering
personal responsibility.
Social demands
Included among the social demands made by Soviet
Democrats are the issues of religion, education, women'
liberation, and public services.

With regard to re

ligion, the Democrats indicate a concern over interference of religious freedom,

4

and demand the right of

all citizens to hold religious and philosophical views
without discrimination or persecution.3

In education

too, the Democrats demand the freedom to investigate,

*loc. cit., p. 36.
2
loc. cit., pp. 38 and 39.
3ibid.
4
loc. cit., pp. 41-44.

—— ^

3ibid.
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research, speak, and write without interference or
censorship. 1

Even women's liberation 2 and public/

social services2 advocacy seems to have caught on with
at least some Democrats.
Cultural demands
In general, Soviet Democrats demand that the
4
intelligentsia be allowed more freedom.
Censorship
is a major concern to the Democrats, and demands range
from a limit to censorship to complete abolition.
Demands have been made that would guarantee authors'
legal rights concerning their creations2 and, in order
to defend their interests, it has further been advo
cated that literary and journalistic associations be
freed of interference so that they might truly repre
sent their members.2

^loC. cit., p p . 45 and
2loc. cit., p. 47.
2ibid •
4loc. cit., pp. 49-51.
2loc. cit., p. 50.
2ibid •
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Political Variables and
Converging Expectations
In attempting to discover variables that might ex
plain the observed propensities of given actors and
groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate
common or converging expectations of democratic reform,
the characteristics which Reddaway^- has described as
tolerance

2

and lack of dogmatism

of investigation.

3

appear to be worthy

The variable "ideology" might be

partially defined in terms of the simple qualitative
dichotomy of dogmatism and lack of tolerance versus
tolerance and lack of dogmatism.
The observed propensities of given actors and
groups within the Democratic Movement to articulate
common or converging expectation of democratic reform
seem most often to occur when the ideological positions
of given actors and groups reflect tolerance and a lack
of dogmatism.

In the nineteenth-century the movements

^■Reddaway, op. cit., p. 24.
^Webster's New International Dictionary of the
English Language. Second Edition, Unabridged. Spring
field, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers,
1961, defines tolerance as "an attitude of (especially
intellectual) forbearance with reference to views,
opinions, or actions with which one is not oneself
fully in sympathy."
^Webster's . loc. cit., defines dogmatism as a
"philosophy which assumes what neither esperience nor
reason can corroborate."
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for systemic change were marked by factionalism, split
ting tactics, and personal intolerance.

The sharp

divergence of the Democratic Movement from this pattern
holds true both in inter-personal dealings and in ideas.
The ideological position of The Chronicle of
Current Events. from the start, has been one of toler
ance and lack of dogmatism.

From the first issue The

Chronicle has carried the text of article 19 of the
United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinion without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.1
In issue No. 7, The Chronicle takes pains to discredit
2
polemical criticism of differing views.
Even while
strongly opposed to a radical anti-democratic program,
The Chronicle "will abandon its usual practice of not
passing judgement" in order to lecture a mocking criti
cism of the program on a lack of serious scientific
criticism.

This has led Reddaway to conclude that two

important points emerge concerning The Chronicle's
editorial position.
First, the Chronicle's aim is openness, nonsecretiveness, freedom of information and
expression. All these notions are subsumed

^"Reddaway, op. cit., p. 24.
2
As translated, loc. cit., p. 432.
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in one Russian word qlasnost. Second, the
Chronicle is not the organ of any rival to the
party, any political “opposition." Indeed the
word opposition appears but rarely in its pages,
mainly perhaps because the K.G.B. often affects,
rightly or wrongly, to see no difference
between opposition to a particular action or
law and opposition to the whole Soviet system.
The Chronicle regards itself as legal because
it merely compiles an accurate record of
events, and where there is truth there can—
legally speaking— be no "libel," "anti-Soviet"
or otherwise. It does not incite its readers
to anti-Soviet acts, but urges them, usually
implicitly, to defend Soviet legality. Cer
tainly, in areas where this legality is
ambiguous it adopts a liberal interpretation.
Thus it believes in genuinely equal rights
for all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R., in
real religious freedom for believers..., and
in a foreign policy of sincerely peaceful co
existence. .. . It rejects in general the use of
coercion, and notwithstanding the moral
absolutism of particular individuals sometimes
reflected in its pages, its own ideology is
clearly reformist and gradualist in nature.
One senses a sceptical view— grounded in
Soviet experience— not only of Jacobinism but
also of the very concept of revolutionary
upheaval.1
The ideological position of the Action Group for
the Defense of Civil Rights in the Soviet Union, at
least with reference to the dichotomy of dogmatism and
lack of tolerance versus tolerance and a lack of dogma
tism, can be discerned by the group's title.

The

Action Group's first letter to the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, furthermore, unmasked the regime's attempts
to utilize the court as a political instrument in the

^"Reddaway, loc. cit., p. 26.
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suppression of ideas.^

"The letter also refers to 'a

particularly inhuman form of persecution:

the placing

of normal people in psychiatric hospitals for their
2
political convictions.'"
Thus, tolerance and lack of
dogmatism is not only the policy of the Action Group,
but also its pursuit.
Sakharov's Human Rights Committee shares essen
tially the same basic philosophy as the Chronicle of
Current Events and the Action Group for the Defense of
Civil Rights in the Soviet Union, although it has per
haps been more careful to avoid irritating the authori
ties.

It has attempted to promote understanding and

interest in the legal rights of all Soviet citizens.
It has also
...noted that the imperfect guarantees of the
rights of the mentally ill create a danger of
violations of Human Rights being committed with
the object of discrediting unorthodox scien
tific, social, political and philosophical
ideas by judging the originators of those ideas
to be mentally ill.^
The ideological position of the Ukrainian dissident
community in general appears to be one of tolerance and

^A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 8,
30 June 1969, as translated in Reddaway, loc. cit.,
pp. 150-151.
^ibid.
^A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 21,
11 September 1971, as translated by Amnesty Inter
national Publications, op. cit., p. 279.
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lack of dogmatism.

In an editorial statement from the

samizdat journal Ukrainian Herald^- came the statement
that "the issuing of the Chronicle was welcomed by the
Ukrainian reader.

The objectivity, extensive volume

and relative accuracy of information...must be noted."

2

The Herald has also commented on the Human Rights
Committee:
In the latter part of 1970 Academician
Sakharov, physicists Tverdokhlebov and
Chalidze created the Moscow Human Rights
Committee— a moderate oppositionary group
which is determined to defend the consti
tutional rights of Soviet citizens. But
its relationship to the nationality ques
tion in the USSR, to the rights of nonRussian nations and their guarantees of
these rights— the Committee did not
determine.3
Thus, in spite of the reservations of Ukrainian demo
crats concerning what they perceive to be a lack of
programmatic postulates on the subject of national
self-determination by Russian democrats, the Ukrainian
democrats accept the Russian democrats as their
legitimate allies.

See Thorne, op. cit., pp. 14-15. Also see
A Chronicle of Current Events, Issue No. 22, 10 Novem
ber 1971, translated by Amnesty International Publica
tions, loc. cit., pp. 44-47.
2

The Ukrainian Herald as translated in Thome,
loc. cit., p. 15.
^ibid.
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Although the Crimean Tatars are only one of several^"
movements of small Soviet minorities struggling for
national existence and repatriation to historical home
lands, their movement is the one most known in the West.
Their goals have significantly broadened to include the
attainment of basic human rights.

The ideology of the

Crimean Tatars, if deduced from their goals, is clearly
one of opposition to all forms of discrimination.

2

That their ideological position is one of tolerance and
lack of dogmatism is further demonstrated by the support
they receive from Russian and Ukrainian dissidents.^
As Thorne

4

has pointed out,

an analysis of the Soviet Jewish community's
response to the mainstream civil rights move
ment in Russia is complex. It entails, first
of all, three groups: the Jewish democrats,
who share in the movement's ideal, the demo
cratization of Russia; the "Zionists," whose
main goal is emigration to Israel and who ad
here to the belief that the movement of the
democrats and their own are two separate
entities, and those Soviet Jews who have been
in-between— individuals who have contributed

^"Besides the Crimean Tatars, there is the Meskhetian
Turks, the Volga Germans, and the Soviet Greeks.
2

Soviet
sented
Slavic
Jewell

See Kowalewski, David, "National Dissent in the
Union: The Crimean Tatar Case." A paper pre
at the Tenth Anniversity (11th Annual) Central
Conference, held 17-18 November 1972 at William
College, Liberty, Missouri, p. 18.

^ibid. Also, see Reddaway, op. cit., p. 269.
4
T h o m e , op. cit., p. 21.
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to both, the democrats' efforts and to the
cause of Jewish emigration.
The Jewish participants in the mainstream Democratic
Movement include Pyotr Yakir, Pavel Litvinov, and
Larrissa Daniel.

In the "in-between" group of Jewish

dissidents T h o m e included Boris Zuckerman, Edward
Kuznetsov, and Julius Telesin.

All these individuals,

as we have seen earlier, are deeply committed to the
mainstream Democratic Movement.

"Whereas the cause of

Israeli emigration has been adopted by the democrats,
the response of Soviet Zionists to the latter*s
activities has been meager, a fact which has aroused
resentment on the part of some democrats."^

Thus,

except for the Soviet Zionists, Jewish commitment to
an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism is be
yond doubt.

That is not to say that the ideology of

the Soviet Zionists is one of dogmatism and lack of
tolerance, but rather that they have avoided the
2
"democratization of the USSR" theme.
Although all three Soviet Constitutions to date
proclaim separation of Church and State, "...the

^loc. cit., p. 23.
2
loc. ext., p. 24. T h o m e suggests that perhaps
this can be partially explained by the Israeli policy
of maintaining that their exists a difference between
the issue of Jewish emigration and Soviet internal
affairs.
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Bolshevik ideology, the fanatical intolerance of Lenin
personally towards religion, and the close association
of the Orthodox Church with the ancien regime all com
bined to make a live-and-let-live relationship
impossible.1,1

The State has staged campaigns of mili

tant atheism, and the religious of the USSR, both
young and old, have responded with defenses, protest,
and counterattacks.

The tolerance and lack of dogma

tism of Russian Orthodox dissenters can most easily be
seen in the works of Anatoly Levitin, Sergei Zheludkov,
and Boris Talantov, which stress that freedom is
2
indivisible.
Recent events among Lithuanian Catholics
suggest their awareness of the Democratic Movement,

3

but as yet they have not recognized any indivisibility
between basic human rights and their struggle for re
ligious freedom.

This again, like the case of the

Soviet Zionists, does not imply that their ideology is

^"Reddaway, op. cit., p. 319.
2
See sections of A Chronicle of Current Events.
as translated, loc. cit., pp. 321-29.
^See "Recent Events Among Lithuanian Catholics,"
A Radio Liberty Dispatch." New York: Radio Liberty
Committee, 15 February 1973, 3 and 6. When the Lithu
anian Catholic priest Seskevicius was unable to obtain
a parish from the Lithuanian Council of Religious
Affairs after serving a one-year sentence for breaking
anti-religious laws, he appealed to Sakharov's Com
mittee on Human Rights in the "Chronicle of the
Lithuanian Catholic Church."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

dogmatic or lacks tolerance.

As for the Baptists, it

can be of no small significance that Boris Zdorovets, a
Baptist from the Donbass, took part in a 1968 political
prison camp strike demanding basic rights for all
political prisoners.'1' Thus, the ideological positions
of believers has not been dogmatic or intolerant.
In the past the main supply of national
ist and national samizdat documents came from
the Ukraine as well as from the Jewish-Zionist
movement. What has been known of the Russianlanguage samizdat (not counting the "outsiders"
Jewish-Zionist writing calling for mass emi
gration...) has been predominantly cosmopolitan
in character. It seems that Russian samizdat
writers have felt responsibility not only for
Russian national interests, but for the whole
Soviet Union, for the problem of freedom in
the whole state.2
However, at least two samizdat documents emphasize
Russian patriotism.

"One document, ‘Slovo natsii1

(or 'A Nation Speaks') represents an extreme nationalist
position with elements of racism; the other document,
Veche. represents a modernized version of traditional
Russian Slavophilism...."

3

While "A Nation Speaks"

See A Chronicle of Current Events. Issue No. 1,
30 April 1968, as translated in Reddaway, op. cit.,
pp. 206-207.
2
Pospielovsky, Dimitri, "The Samizdat Journal
Vechei Russian Patriotic Thought Today," Radio Liberty
Research Paper No. 45. New York: Radio Liberty Com
mittee, 1971, p. 1.
3
loc. cit., p. 2.
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does insist on tolerance, it contains obviously dogmatic
overtones of racism and anti-Semitism as well as the
belief that democracy is a state of aging and decay.^
Veche. on the other hand, simply argues for the right
of Russian dissidents to causes celebres that parallel
2
those of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union.
Thus, the ideological positions of the Great Russian
nationals do, in some instances, reflect dogmatism and
a lack of tolerance.
Certainly, then, the Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean
Tatar, Jewish, and religious dissidents have all shown
themselves, in general, to occupy an ideological posi
tion of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

Yet, there

must be some other variables that might help to explain
why given actors and groups within the Democratic Move
ment practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of
dogmatism.
A good place to begin to look for variables that
might help explain why given actors and groups within
the Democratic Movement practice an ideology of toler
ance and lack of dogmatism, it seems, would be with the
social and geographical background of the actors.
variable of geographical support might run along a

^loc. cit., pp. 6 and 11.
2
loc. cit., p. 12.
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The

continuum from metropolitan, to provincial centers, to
rural.^

The variables of social support might be

measured by a tripartite system of classification
utilizing the categories of intelligentsia, workers,
2
and peasants as classes of social composition.
Amalrik attempted to explore the social background
of Democrats by using as a sample 738 signatories of
protests against the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial.

The

results of his sample indicate that, except for 6%
workers, the signatories were members of what the
3
Soviets call the intelligentsia.
Since the GinzburgGalanskov trial, however, the Democratic Movement seems
to have broadened to include more workers and some mili4
tary people.
Its geographic support too seems to

It must be recognized that these categories are
not exact. For example, although Solzhenitsyn may
reside outside of Moscow and spend his summers at his
cottage, I would still regard him as a representative
of the metropolitan category.
2
By the category "intelligentsia," I mean that
broad Soviet definition whereby academics, artists,
professionals, and students are included.
^Amalrik, Andrei, Will the Soviet Union Survive
Until 1984? New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.,
1970, pp. 15-16.
4
See Katz, op. cit., p. 12. Also, see Reddaway,
op. cit., p. 23.
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include provincial centers as well as the metropolitan
areas.^
In some ways, religious dissidents and those de
manding repatriation to historical homelands share
common attributes. For these two types of dissent are
2
mostly what Katz refers to as non-metropolitan and
non-intellectual.
Their social base is in the medium sized and
small provincial towns and rural areas, mostly
in the peripheral lands: in the Baltic area,
Western Ukraine, the South, Central Asia, the
Caucasus, as well as in the inner parts of
Russia itself (Kaluga, Kirov, Pskov). They
have a small educated intellectual elite, some
of whom live in the big cities. Some of them
address themselves to issues beyond their
national or religious interests and participate
actively in the Democratic dissident movement,
providing a link between the various branches
of dissent (Levitin, Tsukerman, Telesin,
Talantov, Moroz, etc.). But the strength of
the national and religious dissent is in its
widespread roots in the non-elite social groups.
These movements actually have masses of ordin
ary working people in them and many voluntary
grass-roots activists.3
The Tatars and Meskhetians, for example, include almost
all of their populations, which consist mostly of
peasants and workers.

4

^If only by evidence of the spread of the network
of A Chronicle of Current Events.
2

Katz, op. cit., p. 14.

3loc. cit., pp. 14-15.
4
loc. cit., p. 20.
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The national movements of the Ukrainians, Baltic
peoples, and Jews were pioneered mainly by members of
their intelligentsia.

"Many of their activists are,

however, from the working class, and there is suffi
cient evidence that they enjoy support among large
portions of the latter."^

Among Jews of the lands

incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II
and Oriental Jewish communities the dissident movement
has as wide a social base as that of the Tatars or
2
Meskhetians.
"It includes craftsmen, workingmen,
white-collar workers, and intelligentsia.1,3

With -

Soviet Jews proper, the dissident movement includes
some leading intellectuals and scientists, while its
mass following is unclear.

4

Great Russian nationalist dissent is, naturally
enough, found in central Russia.

Its support comes

from some Slavophile intellectuals and students.
Furthermore,
some observers assert that there are sym
pathizers with it in the KGB and in the
army, and that this strand of dissent is
very widespread, though it is not as clearly

^ibid.
2
loc. cit., p. 21.
3ibid.
4ibid.
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discernible as other movements because
little of its materials are available in
samizdat which reaches the West.1
It is clear, then, that those actors most often
addressing themselves to issues beyond the confines of
a narrowly defined "self-interest" will fall within the
category of intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia, by

being the link between the various branches of dissent,
are a major source of the ideology of tolerance and
lack of dogmatism in the Democratic Movement.

Those

branches of whose numbers consist mostly of intelli
gentsia, with the exception of the Great Russian
nationalists, assume most avidly the practice of an
ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.

Further

more, these members of the intelligentsia tend to
reside in or near metropolitan and provincial centers.
The geographical location of this class is understand
able.

The isolation brought about by the rural

location of the majority of the members of those
branches of the Democratic Movement less prone to
avidly assume the practice of an ideology of tolerance
and lack of dogmatism by less frequently, if ever,
addressing themselves to issues beyond a narrowly
defined "self-interest," goes a long way toward ex
plaining their behavior.

The question remains, however,

1loc. cit., p. 23.
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as to why these members of the intelligentsia have come
to practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of
dogmatism.
Certainly the historical experience of the Soviet
intelligentsia looms as a large factor in explaining
the observed propensities of members of this class to
practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism.
For the tremendous early enthusiasm this class demon
strated for the Revolution plummeted into revulsion
and despair^- with the degeneration of the Revolution
into a dogmatic and intolerant order whose foundation
was one of reciprocal fear and suspicion.

This exper

ience can play no small role in explaining why given
actors in the intelligentsia adhere to an ideology of
tolerance and lack of dogmatism.
Another variable that might explain the observed
propensities of members of the intelligentsia to
practice an ideology of tolerance and lack of dogmatism
might possibly be the mode of thought inherent in the
Soviet intelligentsia.

For in stressing the natural

sciences, Soviet education has created a philosophical
opponent for Soviet ideology.

During its maturation

period the Soviet Union was able to create pockets of

^The suicides of Essenin and Mayakovsky might be
examples.
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accurate and reasonably detailed information that were
sealed off from the rest of the community.

This attempt

at isolating the practitioners of scientific philosophy
was made in order to maximize the use of scientific
knowledge in the process of modernization, while at the
same time, preventing the scientific elite from develop
ing into a class capable of advancing its own philosophy.
However, the more complex Soviet society became, the
more increasingly scientific techniques were required
for it to remain efficient.

Any complex social system,

no matter what its political format, requires vast
quantities of accurat-' and substantially detailed in
formation funneled through well marked channels to
designated audiences.^
In this connection it is notable that in the
post-Stalin era, Russian statisticians and
economists have been vocal in their criticism
of some of the earlier statistical methods.
Their grounds are not ideological, but simply
that distorted statistics produce bad decis
ions. The bargain being dirven between
managers and the government in recent years is
of the sort: if you want us to make sound de
cisions, you must give us sound information.2

Fagen, Richard R . , Politics and Communication.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966, p. 91. Also,
see Kuhn, Alfred, The Study of Society: A Unified
Approach. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
and The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963, p. 773.
^Kuhn, ibid.
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Yet the greater the implementation of scientific skills,
the greater the strength of the very philosophy that
denies the existence of speculative philosophy's claim
to infallibility in establishing moral directives that
claim the impelling objectivity of absolute truth.

The

information needs of a complex Soviet society also
encourages the expression of dissent by ending the
isolation that causes the dissident to feel that he is
alone in his disaffection.

For when the information

needs of Soviet society allowed communication to occur,
the opportunity to verbalize disaffection presented
itself.
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POLICY SHIFTS INDUCED BY THE
“DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT"
When examples of a modern totalitarian state are
given, the three states most often mentioned are Nazi
Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union.

There

are, however, significant differences between the three
examples.

One of them is that the first two, Nazi

Germany and Fascist Italy, never survived their found
ing leaders.

So, in reality, the only judgements that

can be made concerning the long term survivability of
the modern totalitarian state must be made in light of
the Soviet experiment.

For the Soviet Union, having

survived its founding leader by 50 years now, provides
us with our first look at a "mature" modern totalitar
ian state.
The political authority of this "mature" m o d e m
totalitarian state is, of course, concerned with the
maintenance of political power in order to preserve the
political, economic, and social system it created.
However, as Barry and Berman1 have observed, the legal
institutions essential to the retention of political

1Barry, Donald D ., and Berman, Harold J ., "The
Jurists," in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. edited
by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 332.
74
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power necessarily create motivation and offer opportuni
ties to challenge that power, at least implicitly.
Should the Soviet political authorities seek to avoid
such a challenge by operating without law, as was done
during the Stalin period, there would be high costs and
penalties.

For while political terror and fear may

have assured survival and the consolidation of power
in the first stage and mobilization in the second stage
of the creation of the Soviet state, it was becoming
counter-productive in the post-mobilization stage.
In the post-mobilization stage, the successful
completion of the rational purposes of the state re
quires the expression of interest articulation to the
extent that it relates to those rational purposes.

For

without the expression of the interests affected by a
particular policy proposal, the policy adaptation to
particular conditions may be unsuccessful.

Thus, it is

possible to suppress interest articulation only to the
extent that it does not matter whether policy is suc
cessful.

It has, therefore, been "...suggested as a

general theorem that interest will be articulated to the
degree that the totalitarian regime pursues rational
purposes."..1

^Castles, Francis G . , "Interest Articulation: A
Totalitarian Paradox." Survey. Autumn 1969, p. 119.
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Now while other forms of shaping and channeling
political behavior have come to play an ever increasing
role in the Soviet Union, the strain within the in
dividual citizen to bring his attitudes into consonance
with his compliant behavior increased.
adjustment took one of two forms:

In essence, the

"...a change in at

titudes producing greater support for the regime, or a
change in behavior producing greater manifest dissent
or defiance."1

Under such circumstances of changed

attitudes among some citizens and changed behavior
among others, the Soviet leadership has often acceded
to articulated interests as long as such interests
"... operate within a common framework of values, and
consequently the demands voiced would not for the most
2
part be disruptive of ideological goals."
What becomes crucial in the "modem" totalitarian
state is the way the interest articulation process is
structured.

For, as Castles

3

has pointed out, at a

local level, and more recently at a not so local level,
criticism may not be discouraged by political authority

Tallin, Alexander, and Breslauer, George, "Politi
cal Terror," in Change in Communist Systems. edited by
Chalmers Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press
1970, p. 198.
2
Castles, op. cit., p. 121.
3
loc. cit., p. 127.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While political authority continues to disapprove of
the politics of formal coalitions, tendencies of
articulation are vocalized by informal coalitions of
interest groups.

The concern, therefore, is apparently

not that a particular interest that lies within the
established framework of values is being articulated,
but whether it is being articulated by a formal inter
est group coalition that may lead to an independent
organization structure and leadership possessing the
potential for opposition to political authority.
The Institutionalization of Criticism
Institutionalization of criticism within the
Soviet framework of values was attempted, as embodied
by the idea of a public inspector, by the Bolsheviks
soon after the revolution.

Although the attempt to

widen participation by the people in monitoring the
Soviet bureaucracy was to take institutional form as
the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection
(NK RKI or Rabkrin) and, later, as the joint Central
Control Committee and Rabkrin (TsKK-RKI), the party
and trade unions, too, created control commissions in
an attempt to give their rank-and-file members an
opportunity to provide input into the new system.
In 1934, Stalin dissolved the Central Control
Committee and Rabkrin, and public inspectors gradually

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78
disappeared.

They were replaced by a group of over

lapping monitoring agencies that included, among others,
the Ministry of State Control, the Ministry of Finance,
the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the Party, and
the ultimate monitoring agency, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.*

Then, in November of 1962, Khrushchev trans

formed the Commission of State Control by combining it
with party and public elements to create the Party-State
Committee (Komitet Partiinogo-gosudarstvennogo kontrolia).

The chief task of this organization, which

was replaced by the People's Control Committee (Komitet
narodnogo kontrolia, or KNK) in December of 1965,
"...is to monitor economic and administrative activities
in the Soviet Union— that is, to seek out inefficiency,
waste, overstaffing, unresponsiveness to citizens'
demands, red-tape, embezzlement, and the host of related ills that beset bureaucracy in all its forms."

2

In the 1965 reorganization of the institutionalized
public critic, the party component was removed.

The

new People's Control Committee was, thereby, made solely

Adams, Jan S., "The People as Monitors of Soviet
Bureaucracy." A paper presented at the 1973 Annual
Meeting of the Rocky Mountain Association for Slavic
Studies, held 26-28 April 1973 at the University of
Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, p. 4.
2
loc. cit., p. 1.
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a state agency.

"The Chairman of the USSR People's

Control Committee is subordinate to central party (and
government) organs and no longer wields party authority
in his own right.

Now while the party role in the

new committee has changed, public participation has not
For,
in 1969, the ratio of paid staff members to
unpaid, "non-staff," volunteer members of the
People's Control Committee was indicated by
Deputy-Chairman I. V. Shikin to be one-to-one
thousand. He stated that the paid staff
membership was just under 7 , 0 0 0 while the
combined volunteer force of people's inspec
tors in Groups and Posts and attached to
Committees was nearly 7 m i l l i o n . 2
The hierarchy of the present institutionalized
form of criticism runs from the USSR People's Control
Committee through Committees formed at each territorial
level downward, eventually ending with Groups and Posts
According to the People's Control Statute,
People's Control Committees...create sections
for branches of the economy, science, and
culture, and permanent and temporary commis
sions.... Workers of these sections and
commissions shall be chosen from among the
most authoritative and experienced workers,
collective farmers, employees, as well as
pensioners.... These workers shall fulfill
commissions, as a rule, in a social procedure,
and when necessary, with the consent of the
directors of the appropriate enterprises,
collective farms, institutions, organizations,

^loc. cit., p. 5,
^ibid.
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with release from basic work for a period of
up to two weeks per year, retaining the
,
average monthly wage at the place of work.
In weighing the importance of the People's Control
Committee as a form of institutionalized criticism, it
becomes essential first to examine the impact of the
ordinary citizen volunteers as opposed to the "paid
staff."

According to the "Statute on the Agencies of

People's Control," the committees at all levels are
supposed to arrive at decisions by majority rule.
Furthermore, the membership of Groups and Posts, the
grass roots of institutionalized criticism, is elected
from the most "outstanding and most active" citizens by
meetings of collectives, soviets, or of the citizens of
population centers.
The second essential task concerning any evaluation
of the importance of the People's Control Committee as
a form of institutionalized criticism must be an
examination of the significance of the role of the
Committees in the evolution of the Soviet system.

Cer

tainly, the present institutionalized form of criticism
provides political authority with information on and
surveillance of the system by providing the Soviet
citizen with the opportunity to improve his position by

^Turovtsev, V. I., ed., Narodny kontrol v SSSR.
Moscow, 1967, pp. 43-44, as quoted in Adams, loc. cit.,
p. 8.
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exposing and correcting abuse of his personal interests.
From the vantage point of the political authority the
present institutionalized form of criticism may require
close supervision to prevent criticism of the system
from going too far, but institutionalized criticism is
also the answer to the growing Soviet need for decen
tralized control.

What it all amounts to is that the

political authority hopes to encourage citizens to
assume a role of "active involvement" in the monitoring
of Soviet society while, at the same time, excluding
them from "decision making."

The problem for the

political authority is that while the party wants the
institutionalized critic to be motivated by altruism
alone, the critic is most likely to be motivated by
personal self-interest.

Thus, it seems, that while the

institutionalized critic may be pursuing goals of
mutual benefit to the system and to himself, the insti
tutionalization of criticism can only add impetus to
the proliferation of interest groups.

For in exposing

and seeking to correct abuse of a personal interest,
it is only natural for the critic to seek out others
who share the same interest.

Here the compartmentali-

zation of specialized skill groups that fragments
intelligentsia solidarity and facilitates Party control,
also fosters "groupism."
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One manner in which the political authority has
attempted to handle the requirement of systemic adapta
tion to the criticism of specialized elites is through
the instrument of "cooptation."^

By drawing repre

sentatives of specialized elites into the policy-making
machinery, political authority hoped that systemic
stability could be increased through an informational
input that would not involve a requisite loss of power.
Allowing input from the specialized elites concerning
their respective areas of endeavor also helps to
legitimize the role of the political elite as political
authority.

With less arbitrary political interference

in their endeavors, the specialized elites are con
fronted with a division of the decision-making process
that allocates "political" decisions to the "political
specialists" of political authority.

In this manner,

political authority can increase the legitimacy of its
decisions while satisfying some of the informational
needs of the system.
While political authority tolerates no direct
challenge to its legitimacy and severely restricts the
flow of information, the informational requirements of

1See Fleron, Frederick J . , Jr., "Co-optation as a
Mechanism of Adaptation to Change: The Soviet Politi
cal Leadership System," in Kanet, Roger E ., The
Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies. New York:
The Free Press, 1971.
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systemic adaptability have resulted in a freer flow of
information and public debate of policy questions.^The advice to the political authority growing out of
these debates runs the gamut from insistence upon the
maintenance of the status quo to suggestions for trans
formation as radical as anything in the history of the
Soviet state.

The political authority thus has become

somewhat of a political broker representing the inter
ests of Soviet society as a whole against the competing
interest groups that tend to violate the common good.
For policy-making since the removal of Khrushchev from
power has been indicative of committee decision-making.
Given the prevailing distribution of funds in favor of
the heavy-industry and defense sectors, "...Soviet
policy in any particular area has remained fairly close
to what the relevant segment of the specialized elite
2
could be predicted to favor."
In contrast to the Khrushchev period, political
authority no longer fights major battles with any of
the specialized elites.

The pressure has been increased,

however, against dissidents demanding fundamental
systemic change.

There are undoubtedly at least two

*See Hough, Jerry F., "The Soviet System: Petri
fication or Pluralism?" Problems of Communism. MarchApril 1973, p. 46.
2
loc. cit., p. 33.
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reasons for this behavior on the part of political
authority.

The leading role of political authority as

defender of the common good, of course, must be pro
tected in the interests of the common good.

Another

reason is that it is in deference to the personal
interests of the members of the establishment.

Un

doubtedly, the fact that policy is less often incor
porated into clear-cut and undebatable ideology has
strengthened the position of political authority with
regards to its role in representing the interests of
the common good in Soviet society.

Thus, flexibility

has strengthened its position on those issues political
authority perceives as most crucial to its survival—
in effect, the very issues addressed by the Democratic
Movement.
The Effect of Dissent on the Soviet Polity
The institutional critics have an important con
tribution to make to systemic stability, but it seems
highly unlikely that some of them do not harbor latent,
even if still rather amorphous, concepts similar to
those held by members of the Democratic Movement.

Such

"insiders" would have the opportunity to initiate change
in the areas the members of the Democratic Movement have
demonstrated concern with, for political authority
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"...is not 'accessible' to the non-elite in the sense
of the latter having any real control over the selection
of the former."^

If fundamental systemic adaptation is

to occur "... in any real sense, the adaptation must be
from within, although the idea of change and the range
2
of alternatives may come from 'outside' sources."
Yet,
there can be little doubt that the balance of resources
are in favor of the more "conservative" members of
political authority.

For the interests articulated in

the Soviet polity are those most crucial to the survival
of the political authority and, therefore, are not
ignored.

Furthermore, "the political culture links

the bureaucratic elite and the 'masses' more closely
than it links the dissidents to either."

3

"Insiders" (like Sakharov) who hold high positions
in a specialized elite and have a certain "authority"
rooted in the functions they perform are limited to
attempting to convince the political authority of the
"error of their ways" and making them realize the
counterproductiveness of continuing "to do business

^Connor, Walter D., "Dissent in a Complex Society:
The Soviet Case." Problems of Communism. March-April
1973, p. 46.'
2ibid.
2loc. cit., p. 50.
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as usual."'''

As for "outsiders," their major contribu

tion will probably continue to be in the area of issues
and ideas.

The continued existence of both groups will

be symptomatic of
...the interplay between the growing complex
ity, or differentiation, of a rapidly modernizing
Soviet society, on the one hand, and the per
sistent reliance- by the regime on what have been
termed 'command-centralist* modes of integrating
the differentiated segments of society in the
face of rising demands for autonomy on the part
of these segments, on the other.2
Yet, while the efforts of both "insiders" and "outsiders
have not brought about systemic changes, it cannot be
said that their efforts have not had their effect on
political authority policy.
The political authority campaign against Sakharov
for his August 1973 warning to the United States against
3

building detente with the USSR on Soviet terms and the
4
banishment of Solzhenitsyn for his campaign against

1loc. cit., p. 48.
2
loc. cit., p. 49.
3
See "Sakharov Warns on Dealing with Soviet," in
The New York Times. 22 August 1973. Also see Shabad,
Theodore, "Soviet Physicist Defies Reds in Warning to
West." . The Boston Herald Traveler, 22 August 1973, p. 1
Or Kaiser, Robert G . , "Soviet scientist defies USSR by
warning West on detente." The Boston Globe. 22 August
1973, p. 1.
4

See
Arrest of
ary 1974,
Exiled to
zenship."

Smith, Hedrick, "7 Russians Make Forcible
Solzhenitsyn." The New York Times. 13 Febru
p. 1. Also see Smith, Hedrick, "Solzhenitsyn
West Germany and Stripped of his Soviet Citi
The New York Times. 14 February 1974, p. 1.
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political authority policies should be enough to
indicate that members of the Democratic Movement are
perceived as a threat.

The partisan coalition labeled

by its members as the Democratic Movement constitutes
an opposition at least perceived by political authority
as being capable of influencing policy.

It is un

doubtedly not that political authority fears that
members of the Democratic Movement (which it also un
doubtedly does not perceive as a movement) will directly
induce it to make policy shifts.

Rather, the political

authority fears that members of the Democratic Movement
may induce foreign governments to make policy altera
tions that will in turn make necessary policy shifts on
its part.

This fear on the part of political authority

may be justified, for the United States Senator Henry M.
Jackson has written the following:
Significantly, the economy of the Soviet
Union is in desperate straits, and we have
been asked to extend to Russia the benefits
of our markets on a most-favored-nation
basis, of our capital at preferential rates,
and of our superlative technology. There
are those who argue that we must make these
trade concessions in the interest of promoting
detente but that we ought not to attach con
ditions that would, at the same time, promote
human rights in the Soviet Union. This is
the argument of the Kremlin. It is also, I
am pleased to say, an argument that we in
the Congress have clearly rejected. The
overwhelming -support for my East-West Trade
and Freedom of Emigration amendment...to
make these benefits conditional on free
emigration is, in my view, not only the best
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hope for the survival and freedom of many
brave people, it is a sound and proper way
to approach the potential detente.1
The Jewish emigration issue provides another example of
how the loose partisan coalition has indirectly (through
inducing other governments to induce Soviet policy
changes) induced political authority policy shifts.

2

In January of 1974 even the press of the People's Re
public of China dealt for the first time in detail with
_3
domestic opposition to Soviet political authority.
Apparently, the Democratic Movement has found a
resource which is "convertible" into influence.

The

fact that political authority policy shifts have been
induced can be measured both in the number of Soviet Jews

^■Jackson, Henry M . , "First, Human Detente." The
New York Times. 9 September 1973.
2
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has risen
from 400 in 1968 to 33,500 in 1973. See "The Jackson
Amendment," The New York Times. 9 March 1974, p. 28.
3
See "China Says Soviet Oppresses People with
Police and Camps." The New York Times. 9 January 1974,
p. 5. In part, the article states the following about
a Hsinhua (the official press agency of the PRC)
broadcast:
The Chinese statement listed numerous
strikes, demonstrations and protests by-Soviet
workers and national minorities as well as by
intellectuals and students in recent years. It
mentioned Lithuania, Latvia, the Ukraine and
Central Asia among places where non-Russian
peoples have expressed dissatisfaction.
It also said that there had been opposi
tion inside the Soviet Union to the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and support for the
anti-Government riots in Poland in 1970.
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allowed to emigrate and by the different manner in
which prominent dissidents are handled.

As a result

of Sakharov's warnings to the West concerning a Soviet
government "armed to the teeth," it may be that even
Soviet military/foreign policy will have been influ
enced.

All this, of course, is a reflection of the

increasing complexity of both Soviet society and the
international community of nations.
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THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM
If the Soviet Union were totally isolated it might
be possible for political authority to avoid ever being
induced to make policy shifts.

However, the Soviet

state exists in a world ever becoming more increasingly
complex.

Systemic adaptation to the demands of this

increasingly complex world has resulted in an increas
ingly complex Soviet state and, as Fagen1 has pointed
out, "as long as complex organization persists,'the
cluster of problems that we group under the heading of
'freedom of expression' will continue to be of political
relevance."

For every organization is held together by
2
communication, and the more complex the system, the

greater the need for accurate and timely information.
—
3
The cost of overvaluing parochial information (that is,
in this case, information produced by non-scientific

^Fagen, Richard R . , Politics and Communication.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966, p. 7.
^North, Robert C . , "The Analytical Prospects of
Communications Theory," in Contemporary Political
Analysis. edited by James C. Charlesworth. New. York:
The Free Press, 1967, p. 302.
^Deutsch, Karl W . , "Communication Models and
Decision Systems," in Contemporary Political Analysis.
edited by James C. Charlesworth. New York: The Free
Press, 1967, p. 298.
90
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methodology) has proven to be extremely high in a
complex system.

The accumulation of the accurate and

reasonably detailed information required for the func
tioning of a stable and productive system has necessi
tated the relaxation of the ideological shackles on
creative research based on scientific methodology.
Tension between the philosophic systems has been the
result.
The history of philosophic systems that are specu
lative creations of fanciful minds has been described
by Reichenbach^ as "...the story of the errors of men
who asked questions they were unable to answer; the
answers which they nonetheless gave can be explained
only from psychological motives."

This is so, says

Reichenbach, because the speculative philosopher "...has
too often sacrificed truth to the desire to give answers,
and clarity to the temptation of speaking in pictures;
and his language has lacked the precision which is the
scientist's compass m

escaping the reefs of error."

2

"Problems," he says, "are solved not through vague
generalities, or picturesque descriptions of the

1Reichenbach, Hans, The Rise of Scientific Phil
osophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1951, p. 117.
2loc. cit., p. viii.
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relations between man and the world, but through tech
nical work."^

The technical analysis of the scientist

inevitably results in a philosophical conflict between
speculative philosophy and science, for science denies
the existence of the absolute truth to which speculative
philosophy lays claim.

The mode of thought character

istic in scientific thought tends to result in a
philosophy which cannot be confined and which denies
the establishment of moral directives that claim the
impelling objectivity of absolute truth.

In an ideo

logical setting, the scientific community will, there
fore, provide the source of a philosophy that encourages
dissidence.

Attempts to isolate the scientific commun

ity in order to maximize the use of scientific knowledge
while preventing the community from developing into a
class capable of advancing its own philosophy becomes
increasingly impossible as the system grows more complex.
In effect, the needs become compounded and the process
circular in that in order to function in a stable and
productive manner the system requires the accurate and
jeasonably detailed information generated by the very
scientific methodology and research that will lead to a
more complex system with even greater accurate and
detailed informational needs.

1loc. cit., p. 117.
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If the system is not flexible enough to meet infor
mational needs as they increase, economic and technical
growth will continue to lag.

On the other hand, should

the system prove flexible enough for political authority
to assume more of the role of an integrative organ and
less that of an exploitative class, the speculative
philosophical baggage would become less and less a basis
for continued dominance of political life by political
authority.
The political elite, certainly, is aware of
the manifold problems it faces— i.e., the
problem posed by lagging economc growth rates
and recurrent agricultural crises, the problem
of reconciling the practical need to grant
greater autonomy to economic managers with the
eternal compulsion toward "control," and the
problem of comprehending the sources of dis
sent and the "style" and the actions of ever
more-publicized dissent ers.-*For political authority has attempted to permit non
political policy-making participation by specialized
elites in return for their skills and, in general, the
members of the specialized elites accept the all per
vasive role of political authority in "political"
decision-making.

The danger to the role of political

authority lies in the fact that as the role of ideology
in policy-making diminishes, "...these specialized

^Connor, Walter D . , "Dissent in a Complex Society:
The Soviet Case." Problems of Communism. March-April
1973, p. 45.
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elites might attempt to trade their skills for some
degree of participation in the political policy-making
process."1

Thus, while "hegemonic" political dominance

by political authority may become increasingly costly
and inefficient as Soviet society becomes ever more
sophisticated, it does not follow that the institutional
framework must change.

Indeed, systemic adaptability
2
may be reflected in the incrementalism of what Hough
calls "institutional pluralism."
According to Hough,

3

institutional pluralism would

fall "...somewhere in between authoritarianism and
classical pluralism."

In such a system,

...those who want to effect political change
must, with few exceptions, work within the
official institutional framework. While any
citizen can make appeals or suggestions for
incremental change through official channels,
the leading political participants will almost
always be "establishment" figures....4
With the break-down of monolithic political authority,
the multiplicity of interests in society would tend to

Fleron, Frederick J . , "Toward a Reconceptualiza
tion of Political Change in the Soviet Union: The
Political Leadership System," in Communist Studies and
the Social Sciences. edited by Frederick J. Fleron, Jr.
Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969, p. 232.
^Hough, Jerry F . , "The Soviet System: Petrifica
tion or Pluralism?" Problems of Communism. March-April
1972, p. 28.
^ibid.
4

loc. cit., p. 29.
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be represented by temporary alliances of institutional
forces functioning within the framework of tolerable
political behavior.

If input of broader societal forces

is reflected by the behavior of these institutional
forces, the risk of popular unrest can be reduced.

Such

a combination of inclusiveness and public contestation
would be indicative of a modest step toward polyarchy.
While the attitudes and demands of the Democratic
Movement often reflect abstract ideas of human rights,
"the masses as a whole do not demand 'legality,1 repre
sentative institutions, 'freedom,' which to them are
unfamiliar and exotic concepts."^

The masses tend to

be more interested in the economic gains that translate
into more and better made consumer goods.

Having

sacrificed for over fifty years in order to build a
better future, the Soviet people are beginning to
anticipate its arrival.

Presently,

their economic demands are modest and are
being met— if slowly and with occasional
setbacks— so far as housing, consumer goods,
and food are concerned. Perhaps, sometime
in the not so distant future, they can even
look forward to owning a Zhiquli car. In their
own terms, they "never had it so good."2

^"Connor, op. cit., p. 50.
2
ibid. But there remains unattractive prospects
for political authority:
Between 1960 and 1967 consumer disposable in
comes rose by 69 percent, but personal savings
rose by 148 percent, or at more than twice the
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Yet, a consumer revolution would be bound to have its
effect on the system.

A look at how the automobile

alone affected the development of the West should be
enough to suggest some of the ramifications of increased
consumerism in Soviet society.

Furthermore, it cannot

be assumed that expectation levels will remain stable.
Should economic and technical growth continue to
lag, the discrepancy of the distribution of rewards
within the system can only be aggravated.

Explanations

for the discrepancy that may have originally been per
ceived have "...been brought to the fore by the natural
proclivity of the older, hitherto privileged group to
prevent the downward mobility of their children...."1
The result is a "...painfully frustrating clash between
the ideology-born expectations and the actual life

rate. Whereas the Soviet consumer was saving
17 percent of his additional incomes in 1960,
by 1967 he was saving 49 percent. Such a high
rate of savings is unprecedented in any econ
omy, let alone one with the low per capita
income of the U.S.S.R. Obviously, there is a
situation of rising unsatisfied consumer demands.
Taken from Cohn, Stanley H . , "General Growth Performance
of the Soviet Economy," in Economic Performance and the
Military Burden in the Soviet Union. A compendium of
papers submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress
of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970, pp. 12-13.
1Bauman, Zygmunt.
"Twenty Years After: The Crisis
of Soviet-Type Systems." Problems of Communism.
November-December 1 9 7 1 , p. 47.
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experiences of young people.'*^

A new consciousness can

be expected to develop particularly among the new
industrial proletariat, for there is no reason to
assume that a new industrial working class consciousness
will not develop and take shape as it did before rem
nants of the old proletariate were lost in the massive
influx of rural elements during the mobilization stage.
The new proletarian worker, being brought up in the
post-mobilization stage of the development of the
Soviet state,
... is ready and able to give more than passing
thought to what he has repeatedly been told
about his right to rule the country. And if
he and his fellows were asked how they would
run their factory, local community, or country,
they— unlike most of their fathers— would cer
tainly have something to s a y . 2
While it can be expected that, as their class con
sciousness develops, they will first direct their
attention to obtaining economic gains, Bauman

3

argues

that "...it is fairly certain that they will not miss
whatever opportunities present themselves to place
their bargaining power on a more constant and secure
footing."

Political authority, of course, is attempting

to forestall the challenge that such a rise of

1loc. cit., p. 48.
2
loc. cit., p. 51.
^ibid.
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class-consciousness would signify by conducting a "war
on poverty" involving a narrowing of the inequalities in
income by granting significant raises of the minimum
1
wage.
Although "one might be tempted to think that the
dichotomous image of society is a relic of Marxism or,
more generally, of the conditions of early capitalism
2
and their interpretation," the "consciousness" of the
institutions and values of industrial democracy and
"unionism" would be bound to provoke its re-assertion.
For whatever changes may have occurred in the last
fifty or so years of the history of the proletariat in
the Soviet Union, "...the idea that there is a

^Hough, op. cit., p. 39.

He states that

the precise impact of Brezhnev's "war on
poverty" will not be clear until Moscow de
cides to publish fuller income data, but it
may well be that the Soviet Union in recent
years has seen a shift in income distribution
that is quite striking by Western standards,
and that the pattern of income distribution
in the Soviet Union today is substantially
more egalitarian than it is in the advanced
Western countries, particularly if income
from property is taken into account. In any
case, if it is true, as many contend, that
the entrenched ruling elite in the Soviet
Union has been gaining in power since
Khrushchev's fall, at least its allegedly
augmented authority does not appear to be
reflected in a larger share of the national
income.
2
Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1959, p. 287.
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fundamental division of society into 'haves' and 'havenots,'

'above' and 'below,'

'them' and 'us' is still a

force in the minds of many people."^

Despite the new

prolitariat's present, and perhaps even future, hesita
tion "...to draw pronouncedly radical political
conclusions from their dichotomous image of society,"

2

it will remain a threatening manner in which to perceive
the system because of its potential to be activated into
an ideology of political conflict with which to confront
political authority.

The "trigger" to such a confronta

tion would be the point at which the functionaries of
political authority become so alienated from the new
proletariat that it no longer makes any difference in
whose name they claim to function.
Political class conflict, industrial class
conflict, regional conflicts, conflicts
between town and country, possibly racial
conflicts— all are superimposed so as to
form a single and all-embracing antagonism.
Under these conditions, the intensity of
political conflict reaches its m a x i m u m . 3
The increasingly perceptible contradiction between
the nature and consequences of the scientific and
technological revolution on the one hand and, on the
other, the ideological superstructure brings the system

^ibid.
2
loc. cit., p. 289.
^loc. cit., p. 316.
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to the verge of what Garaudy1 calls “the crisis in com
munism."

According to Bauman, if the response of

political authority
...boils down to little more than another round
in a game of musical chairs at the top leader
ship level, it will likely prove a temporary,
makeshift solution that does not satisfy the
requirements of the social processes that
generated the crisis.2
To borrow a phrase from Burton,

3

"...if the goal is

peace and stability, conflict must be resolved, and not
merely settled."

The power relationships and the rele

vant facts of the crisis are apparently known, but the
resolution of the crisis will require more than threats,
bargains, and persuasion.

For the resolution of the

crisis will necessitate greater subsystem interaction
and participation in political policy-making.
Subsystem Interaction and Its Effects
Undoubtedly, the largest goal-seeking aggregates
pursuing coherent common interests in the Soviet

See Garaudy, Roger, The Crisis in Communism: The
Turning-Point of Socialism. New York: Grove Press, Inc.,
1970. The French Marxist theoretician was expelled from*
the French Communist. Party after his unmitigated opposi
tion to the 1968 Soviet led Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
2
Bauman, op. cit., p. 47.
3
Burton, J. W . , Systems. States. Diplomacy and
Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968,
p. 117.
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political system are the occupations, although their
activities are generally limited to the issue of "pro
fessional autonomy."

This is not, however, to dismiss

group activity by occupations as insignificant.

For

while such activity has been infrequent, progress on
the goal of "professional autonomy" has tended to make
political articulation more acceptable to political
authority.

Being deemed as a necessity in order to come

to terms with the problems of a complex society, this
communication between occupations and political author
ity is bound to be an interaction among conflicting
tendencies of articulation, particularly as the social
order becomes more complex.

What is more, it can be

expected that beyond the issue "professional autonomy"
internal conflicting tendencies of articulation over
issues to be raised with political authority would
appear within occupational organizations.

Once political

articulation has been made legitimate by political
authority, it is difficult to restrict.

The more the

"privilege" is extended, the greater the pressure for
participation by those who remain excluded.
Increased participatory activity on the part of
members of occupational and institutional aggregates
can be expected to take the form of intense and continu
ous internal struggles over the political articulations
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of their respective aggregates.

Internal opposition to .

the "group line," however, need not end with what
Griffiths1 calls "parallel unilateral articulations of
2
virtually atomized individuals." For as Gorgone has
stated, "to the precise extent that the political issue
which divides them from the majority of their fellow
workers crosses the boundaries of other /aggregates/,
the oppositionists will find that they are acting as
part of a larger coalition, or tendency of articulation."
Indeed, loose associations (such as the Democratic
Movement) that cut across occupational and institutional
aggregates can be expected to be formed to articulate
political demands that members' respective organizations
fail to articulate.

In essence, then, both within the

system and all its units
...policy on a given issue is likely to be
internally contradictory and may be under
stood as the interaction among conflicting
tendencies of articulation prior to, during,
and after the taking of official decisions;

Griffiths, Franklyn, "A Tendency Analysis of
Soviet Policy-Making," in Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics. edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn
Griffiths. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1971, p. 342.
2
Gorgone, John, "The Legislative Process in the
USSR: Soviet Jurists and the Reform of Criminal
Procedure, 1956-1958." Unpublished doctor's disser
tation, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana,
1974, p. 257.
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similarly, fluctuations in value allocation
or in the policy "line" may be seen as
shifts in the relative influence of con
flicting tendencies.^
Thus, any attempt to analyze Soviet policy-making must
take a systems approach that takes into consideration
political articulation by cross occupational and insti
tutional aggregate groups as well as the aggregates
most generally associated with the more traditional
group theory as it developed in the West.
Most certainly among those occupation and insti
tutional aggregates whose political articulations will
help bring about the preconditions for the development
of polyarchy in the Soviet Union are the managers of
the consumer goods and light industries, agronomists,
2
and those economists favoring decentralization.
Should the increased complexity that would result from
the satisfaction of their expectations occur, the com
munications necessary for the functioning of an even
more complex system would require more participation and
provide greater possibilities of tendency articulation

^"Griffiths, op. cit., p. 361.
2
See Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Soviet Political
System: Transformation or Degeneration," in Dilemmas
of Change in Soviet Politics. edited by Zbigniew
Brzezinski. New York: Columbia University Press,
1969, pp. 22-23.
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conflicts.

As Schmidt* has pointed out, "for political,

strategic, and economic reasons, the Soviet Union is
likely to continue its efforts to achieve selfsufficiency in the supply of basic foodstuffs...."

In

this attempt at agricultural self-sufficiency political
authority has followed the controversial "Virgin-Lands
Program" with an effort to farm the steppes of northern
2
Russia and Siberia only about one-half year after
Solzhenitsyn's recommendation "...to shift the center
of the Government's attention and center of national
effort (and with it, the center of settlement and the
focus of search for the young)...into its Northeast."
Yet whether or not this project is significant in pro
duction expansion, decentralization in the form of

Schmidt, Stephen C. East-West Trade in Wheat:
Present and Potential. Urbana-Champaign, Illinois:
University of Illinois, September 1973, p. 21.
2
See Smith, Hedrick, "Brezhnev Unveils a Vast
Effort to Farm Steppes of Northern Russia," in The
New York Times. March 16, 1974. Also see "Soviet Loans
Set in New Farm Plan," in The New York Times. 4 April
1974, p. 16. The fifteen year agricultural program to
develop the northern non-black soil lands of the Russian
Republic involves a 128.5 million acre zone requiring
15,535 miles of road construction to open up.
3
Shabad, Theodore.
"Solzhenitsyn Asks Kremlin to
Abandon Communism and Split Up Soviet Union," in The
New York Times. 3 March 1974, p. 26. Solzhenitsyn's
recommendation was part of an approximately 15,000
word letter addressed to Soviet political authorities,
dated 5 September 1973.
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decollectivization is the answer to the inevitably
increasingly pronounced lag in Soviet agriculture.
Grave, too, is the second grand dilemma which
is already bedeviling the Moscow elite— the
growing backwardness in the organization of
production and consumption of goods, arising
from the widening gap between ever-advancing
technology and the obsolete Marxian economic
system.1
These two dilemmas can be overcome only through basic
structural reform.

"The ideological obstacle to such

a reform is the official dogma according to which the
kolkhoz— the collective farm— is a basic pillar of the
2
Soviet social system."
In industry and trade, a
rigidly centralized economy stifles the enterprise of
independent management to the extent that they fail to
fulfill the demands of a m o d e m industrialized society.
It is the political articulations of the managers of
the consumer goods and light industries, agronomists,
and those economists favoring decentralization that
offer the possibility of such structural reform.

It is

likely, however, that the implementation of reform in
the fields of management and agriculture will have to

^"Levine, Isaac D o n , "The Crises Ahead," in Dilemmas
of Change in Soviet Politics. edited by Zbigniew
Brzezinski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969,
p. 99.
2
Halpem, Ernst, "Beyond Libermanism," in Dilemmas
of Change in Soviet Politics. loc. cit., p. 104.
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be preceded by the implementation of an optimal planning
system for the economy that would generate a need for
improved economic efficiency, which would require a new
system of management and agricultural re-organization.
The extreme liberalization of non-planning could not
safely occur because of the danger of the centrifugal
forces in the Soviet Union that can be seen at "play"
in Yugoslavia.
Judy^ has stated that "the positions of any Soviet
economist can be predicted with considerable accuracy
if information is available on his age, his organization
of primary affiliation, and his degree of mathematical
proficiency."

He has found clusterings of liberal

opinion at the enterprise and sovnarkhoz levels of
industrial management and at laboratories and insti
tutes of the various academies of science outside of
the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of
2
Sciences.
Now while many of the younger economists
accept the basic tenets of Marxian macro-sociological
theory, they hold classical Soviet political economy

Judy, Richard, "The Economists," in Interest
Groups in Soviet Politics. edited by H. Gordon
Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 251.
2
loc. cit., p. 240.
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in deepest scorn.^

They seek to influence policy by

elaborating various policy options in an attempt to
“...convince their colleagues, other specialist elites,
and public opinion through 'debates' carried on through
2
the medium of public meetings and the press."
With
the older and more conservative economists occupying
many important positions of power, the younger mathe
matical economists must take a slow, and deliberate,
evolutionary approach.

Recent attempts at economic

reform "...represent compromises laboriously produced
from sharp contending positions expounded by competing
groups of economists."

3

The incomparably greater

capacity of the mathematical economists to define
complex economic situations in a logical manner
heightens their ability to influence policy.

4

For the

mathematical economists are the only economists who can
offer political authority the expert advice that has
been made necessary by the complexity and functional
specialization of the economy.^

While political

authority has no intention of abandoning the central

^loc. cit., p. 250.
2
loc. cit., p. 248.
^ibid.
4ibid.
^loc. cit., p. 249.
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planning system that is basic to the state-controlled
economy, it is interested in achieving a more balanced
and orderly growth of the Soviet economy.

Such a

thing would require a model of economic growth that
would shift from "ultra-industrialization" to "..ra'more
nearly balanced model, in which greater attention would
be given to agriculture and consumer n e e d s . U n f o r t u 
nately, in light of the specter of lost employment and
resultant hardship for the bureaucrats involved, staunch
bureaucratic resistance has been brought on.
Despite the recognition that "...economic reform
is becoming an increasingly important factor in the
2
development of the U.S.S.R.'s national economy," the
hesitancy of political authority to violate the immediate
interests of the bureaucracy has resulted in setbacks
for the reform cause.

For in its attempt to pacify the

bureaucracy by mollifying economic reform, political
authority has created reform attempts so complex that
they have "...led instead to greater 'bureaucratization

^Shabad, Theodore, Moscow Backs New Economists,"
in The New York Times. 5 June 1973, p. 59.
2
Drogxchinsky, N . , "The Economic Reform and the
Improvement of the Management of the National Economy."
Planovoye khozyaistvo. No. 11, November 1970, as it
appeared in translation in The USSR Today: A Soviet
View. Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1972, p. 71.
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of economic life* and 'creeping recentralization.1"*
Thus, the impact of needed practical reform has been
significantly reduced "merely by doing what comes
naturally to large, entrenched bureaucracies anywhere
when they are threatened with change— that is, procrastinating, assimilating, complicating, and regulating."

2

The response by political authority is likely to con
tinue to be "bland exhortation and low-key tinkering
3
with organization and reform...."
Yet, the pressures
for economic reform that have led to the so far illfated reforms are only bound to grow as a result of
failures to make significant gains in resolving the
problems besetting the economy.

According to Dodge,

4

^Schroeder, Gertrude E . , "Soviet Economic Reform
at an Impasse." Problems of Communism. July-August
1971, p. 46.
2
loc. cit., p. 37.
^Ermarth, Fritz W . , "Politics and Policy in the
Brezhnev Regime: A Force for Continuity?" in Analysis
of the USSR1s 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan.
edited by Norton T. Dodge. Proceedings of a symposium
sponsored by the Washington Chapter of the American
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and
The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington
University. Mechanicsville, Maryland: The Cremona
Foundation, 1971, p. 85.
4
Dodge, Norton T . , "Plan and Economy Discussion,"
in Analysis of the USSR1s 24th Party Congress and 9th
Five-Year Plan, loc. cit., p. 71.
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there seems to be little doubt that the main
reason for rapid Soviet growth in the past
has been the ability of the regime with a
little carrot and much stick to mobilize and
to put to work the various factors of produc
tion: labor, capital, and natural resources.
From this, he concludes that
now that reserves of labor in agriculture and
among women have been drawn down; now that the
best land and natural resources are more fully
utilized; now that increases in the capital
stock, both fixed and human, are more difficult
to achieve; and now that technological advance
is less easy as the technological frontier is
approached in more sectors, the Soviet Union
must find economic growth at past rates more
difficult to achieve.1
The political authority desire for a more balanced and
orderly growth of the Soviet economy must, therefore,
turn to the increased efficiency to be obtained through
decentralization and improvement of the central planning
that would remain.

Except for the assistance obtained

from Western technology, only in this manner can the
Soviet economy sustain the continued growth that will
guarantee the increased complexity that requires the
communication or interaction of conflicting tendencies
of articulation.

The alternative is to continue to walk

an allocation tightrope between the heavy-industry and
defense sectors and the rising expectations of the new
proletariat over the chasm of a further decline in
productivity and growth rate.

^loc. cit., pp. 71-72.
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Another process that is complicating subsystem
interaction is what might be termed a "bureaucratic
generation conflict."

For while the "old guard" bureau

cracy struggles to hold the line against the reformers,
it is simultaneously being attacked by those who joined
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Stalin's
death.

The reason for the attack, of course, is that

"...while twenty years is a sufficient period of time
to underscore the erosion of the administrative skills
of the old guard— which were meager from the onset— it
is not long enough for them to have grown too old to
cling to the positions awarded..."'*' during the period
when careers were built over the bodies of colleagues
who perished.

"Since 1952 the average age of the

Central Committee has increased at each congress; re
newal has not kept pace with the passage of time nor
2
involved enough sufficiently younger men."
Now while
both bureaucratic generations are confronted by the
technically-trained occupational aggregates demanding
a larger role in decision making, they also find the

^"Bauman, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
2
Daniels, Robert V., "Participatory Bureaucracy
and the Soviet Political System," in Analysis of the
USSR's 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan.
op. cit., p. 79.
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old guard's dogmatic ideology and the new guard's more
pragmatic and flexible approach to the increasing com
plexity of industrialization and the modernization
process places them on different sides of the barricade.
Yet despite their self-identification with the cause of
technical rationality, the new guard must be mindful not
to u ndemine "...the traditional legitimizing foundations
on which the authority of rulers over experts has
hitherto rested, thus rendering themselves vulnerable
to the challenge of the latter."'*’ The fact that their
turn to rule will come is as certain as the eventual
passing of the old guard.

The more important question

is how the channels of participatory bureaucracy may
reflect and accommodate the currents of new opinion
among the intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement as
a whole.^
The effect of subsystem interaction to date has
been "...to serve as a fairly effective channel for the
transmission of all manner of ideas and desires from
below upwards."^

However, the increasing complexity of

industrialization and the modernization process that has

1Bauman, op. cit., p. 49.
2
Daniels, op. cit., p. 79.
^loc. cit., p. 78.
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made necessary the obtaining of accurate information
has resulted in responsiveness to interests from below.
A pattern of increased vulnerability of top political
authority personalities has emerged since the death of
Stalin.

As Daniels^" has pointed out, "...Khrushchev's

career with his near-defeat in 1957, his evident diffi
culties after 1960, and his ultimate demise at the
hands of his own bureaucratic subordinates, demonstrates
the growing vulnerability of the top leadership vis-avis the Central Committee."

Most certainly. Hough

2

is

correct when he concludes that "...it is hard to believe
— barring a major crisis— that a General Secretary will
soon choose to challenge the fundamental interests of
as many different institutional groups as Khrushchev
did."

Yet, deference on the part of political authority

to the political articulations of institutionalized
groups does not imply tolerance for the articulations
of a loose cross aggregate coalition like the Democratic
Movement that can be perceived as vocalizing demands
that are disruptive of ideological goals„

For the dis

ruptive (as perceived by political authority and the
more conservative elements that presently control

1ibid.
2
Hough, op. cit., p. 44.
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political articulations of occupational and institu
tional aggregates) results of the behavior of members
of the Democratic Movement when they control an insti
tutionalized tool of political articulation is clear
from the turmoil created by the late Alexander Tvardovsky
while he was editor of Novyi Mir.

Furthermore, the

Democratic Movement presents the threat of providing
the "linkage" between institutionalized interest groups
should institutionalized tools of political articulation
be seized by Democrats.

Such a "linkage" could lead to

a formal coalition with its patterned interaction,
"official" spokesmen, etc.

It is this cross fertiliza

tion of institutional aggregates that is the key to the
formation of formal coalitions.

Thus, it will be the

outcome of cross fertilization between the institution
alized groups and the resultant formation of formal
cross aggregate coalitions that will determine the course
of the tendency conflict over systemic adaptability and
the possibilities for the development of a pluralistic
political system.
The Course of Tendency Conflict
As Burton^" has suggested, "movements seeking social
reform...need to be examined in the context of the whole

^Burton, J. W . , Systems. States. Diplomacy and Rules.
London: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 16.
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of the relationships involved...."

Thus, in order to

determine whether the Soviet political system can
accommodate the formal "institutionalization" of the
cross aggregate coalition that has called itself the
"Democratic Movement," an analysis of the whole environ
ment of the system in which systemic adaptability is
being sought is the best approach.

For the success or

failure of cross fertilization between institutionalized
groups will be determined to a great extent by the
environment in which it must take place.

Most certainly,

"the most powerful recent analysis of the general con
ditions under which a nation can transform itself into
a democracy is Robert Dahl's Polyarchy.11^

Polyarchy,

according to Dahl, exists when there is a high level of
participation in a highly competitive public contesta
tion environment, and he identifies seven sets of
complex conditions (see Table I) that favor the develop
ment of these two parameters.

Although the variables

are imprecise and measurement is difficult, a suggestive
profile of the Soviet Union's potential for polyarchy
may be created.

Stokes, Gale, "Is Yugoslavia in Transition to
Democracy?" A paper presented at the Rocky Mountain
Association for Slavic Studies, held 27-28 April 1973
at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, p. 1.
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Table I
Dahl's "Conditions Favoring Polyarchy"

I. Historical
sequences

II. The socio
economic order:
A. Access to
1. Violence
2. Socio
economic
sanctions
B. Type of
economy
1. Agrarian

Most favorable
to polyarchy

Least favorable
to polyarchy

Competition pre
cedes inclusive
ness

Inclusiveness
precedes com
petition
Shortcut: from
closed hegemony
to inclusive
polyarchy

Dispersed or
neutralized
Dispersed or
neutralized

Monopolized

Free farmers

Traditional
peasant
Centralized
direction

2. Commercial- Decentralized
industrial direction
III. The level of
socioeconomic
development
IV. Equalities and
inequalities
1. Objective

2. Subjective:
relative
deprivation

Monopolized

High: GNP per
capita over
about $700-800

Low: GNP per
capita under
about $100-200

Low, or
Parity and dis
persed inequali
ties
Low or de
creasing

High: Cumula
tive and
extreme
High or
increasing
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Table I— Continued

V. Subcultural
pluralism
1. Amount
2. If marked or
high

VI. Domination by a
foreign power
VII. Beliefs of poli
tical activists
1. Institutions
of polyarchy
are
legitimate
2. Only uni
lateral
authority is
legitimate
3. Polyarchy is
effective in
solving major
problems
4. Trust in
others
5. Political
relationships
are:
strictly
competitive
strictly
cooperative
cooperat ivecompetitive
6. Compromise
necessary and
desirable

Most favorable
to polyarchy

Least favorable
to polyarchy

Low
None a majority
None regional
None indefin
itely out of
government
Mutual
guarantees
Weak or tempor
ary

High
One a majority
Some regional
Some perman
ently in
opposition
No mutual
guarantees
Strong and
persistent

yes

no

no

yes

yes

no

high

low

no

yes

no

yes

yes

no

yes

no

Taken from Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation
and Opposition. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1971, p. 203.
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Historical sequences
As Dahl points out, "in the future as in the past
...stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more
likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes
than from the revolutionary overthrow of existing
hegemonies."^

The Soviet historical experience follows

Dahl's prediction concerning short-cuts to polyarchy.
For the Bolshevik Revolution saddled the Soviet regime
with so many serious conflicts over legitimacy that
regression toward hegemonic rule was assured.

The

evolution that had been taking place previous to the
end of Tsarist Russia and the short shock experience
of democracy in 1917 had not successfully created a
system of mutual guarantees.

Therefore, because the

rules of the political game were ambiguous, the
legitimacy of competitive politics was weak, and the
Bolsheviks not entirely confident that it was safe to
tolerate their opposition or allies, the costs of sup
pression were not perceived as being inordinately high.
While Soviet political authority has not denied the
legitimacy of popular participation in government and
has, therefore, granted the citizens of the Soviet Union

^Dahl, Robert A . , Polyarchy: Participation and
Opposition. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1971, p. 45.
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the right to vote in nominal elections, it continues
to deny the right of opposition in “elections."

With

inclusiveness preceding competition in this manner,
progress toward public contestation is likely to be
complex and time consuming because of the difficulty
of working out a system of mutual security under the
conditions of universal suffrage and mass politics.^
The Soviet Union, therefore, would rank extremely low,
or not very favorably for the development of polyarchy
on the condition of historical sequences (see Figure I
Condition I).
The socioeconomic order
"The likelihood that a government will tolerate
an opposition increases as the resources available to
the government for suppression decline relative to the
resources of an opposition." 2

As Connor 3 has so cor

rectly concluded,

loc. cit., p. 39. The role of the Soviet legal
profession in advocating the values of law which
transcend any given political, economic, or social
system is critical for the development of mutual
security.
2
loc. cit., p. 48.
^Connor, op. cit., p. 51.
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...while resources and skills may now be
more widely distributed in the USSR than
ever before and quite possibly the mainten
ance of centralistic, "hegemonic" political
control is becoming more costly and ineffi
cient as the society itself becomes more
"advanced," nevertheless the balance of
resources today still seems to favor the
maintenance of a hegemonic system.
Because "the likelihood that a government will tolerate
an opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity
of the government to use violence or socioeconomic
sanctions to suppress oppositions"'*’ however, such
occurrences as the inadequacy and uncooperativeness of
both militia (local police) and military during the 1962
2
riot in Novocherkassk raises the issue of neutralized
coercive resources.

Yet the fact that political

authority was able to successfully employ motorized
units of the KGB against its opposition was indicative
of the fact that it continued to monopolize violence.
Furthermore, through such tools as the labor booklet
system^ political authority also continues to monopolize
socioeconomic sanctions.

Thus the Soviet political

^Dahl, op. cit., p. 49.
2
See Lyons, Eugene, "The Realities of a Vision," in
Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics. edited by Zbigniew
Brzezinski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969,
pp. 53-54.
3
See Area Handbook for the Soviet Union. Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971,
p . 148.
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system ranks extremely low, or very unfavorably for
the development of polyarchy, on the conditions of access
to violence and socioeconomic sanctions.

For both are

monopolized by political authority, and seldom are even
temporarily neutralized (see Figure I, Condition II A).
The m o d e m Soviet state can trace its historical
past to a traditional peasant society characteristically
associated with a hegemonic political authority.

The

norms of extreme inequalities in land distribution and
instruments of coercion which were reinforced by norms
favoring inequalities of class resulted in the extreme
inequalities of political resources which, in turn, re
sulted in a hegemonic political system that by virtue
of a centrally dominated social order reinforced the
extreme inequalities.^- The fact that the social order
remained highly centralized and, therefore, the politi
cal system hegemonic after the creation of the Soviet
state only assured the centralized direction of the
economy by political authority.

Thus, the traditional

peasant agrarian background and the centralized direc
tion of the commercial-industrial economy means that the
Soviet political system falls into two more "least
favorable to polyarchy" category conditions (see
Figure I, Condition II B).

■^Dahl, op. cit., p. 49.
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The level of socioeconomic development
Although an advanced economy does not create all
the conditions required for a pluralistic social order,
it does create many of the conditions required.^

It

requires for its performance the distribution of the
very political resources and skills that threaten
hegemonies by generating demands for a pluralistic
social order.

The greater the pluralism of the social

order, the greater the demands for political liberali
zation in the form of competitive politics.

Thus,

Dahl finds a distinct correlation between a high level
of socioeconomic development and the transformation of
a hegemonic regime into a polyarchy.

Already in 1957

the Soviet GNP per capita had neared the threshold
Dahl's data indicated as beyond which any further in
creases would not affect the chances for the development
of competitive politics or polyarchy.

2

Since then the

growth of the Soviet GNP per capita has moved the
Soviet Union beyond that threshold (see Figure I,
Condition III).3

1loc. cit., pp. 76-80.
2
loc. cit., p. 69.
3
Cohn, op. cit., p. 13. The 1967 Soviet GNP per
capita of $1552 (up from $600 in 1957) placed the Soviet
Union fifth behind the United States, the Federal Re
public of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
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Equalities and inequalities
The industrialization undergone by the traditional
peasant society in the Soviet Union transformed 11...a
system of cumulative inequalities into a system of
greater parity with respect to some key resources...."^
A greater parity in the distribution of resources and
dispersed political inequalities have been the result
of the reallocation of rewards and privileges as the
Soviet system approached a high level of industrializa
tion.

For the cumulation and extreme inequalities in

political resources of its traditional peasant society
past have been reduced and Brezhnev's "war on poverty"
continues to narrow those inequalities affected by
2
income.
Yet perceived differences remain, and repre
sent a potential threat to political authority.

While

favorable comparisons are made with the past, far more
salient and relevant may be the new proletariat1s
dichotomous image of society.

Though an individual by

nature may compare himself or his specific group to
others not very distant, socially speaking, the
ideology-born expectations of the new prolitariat are
that there should be no others very distant.

Inequality,

"^Dahl, op. cit., p„ 87.
2
See Hough, op. cit., p. 39.
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then, is not particularly high, although perceptions of
a dual system (one for the elite of the CPSU and one
for non-Party members) may be increasing (see Figure I,
Condition IV).
Subcultural pluralism
That subcultural pluralism often places a
dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual
security required for a system of public con
testation seems hardly open to doubt. Polyarchy
in particular is more frequently found in rela
tively homogeneous countries than in countries
with a great amount of subcultural pluralism.1
Dahl suggests four differences that give rise to durable
subcultures:

religion, language, race, or ethnic
2
groups, and region.
The development of polyarchy in
the Soviet Union is handicapped by all four differences.
While atheism is the state "religion,” "...observers
estimate that there are between 50 and 70 million Soviet
citizens who adhere to some degree to a religious
faith."^

There are over 100 different languages spoken
4
in the Soviet Union and "more than 170 separate ethnic

^Dahl, op. cit., p. 108.
2
loc. cit., p. 106.
3
Background Notes: U.S.S.R. Washington, D.C.:
Department of State Publication, July 1967, p. 3.
4
Area Handbook for the Soviet Union. op. cit.,
p. 181.
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groups live within the borders of the U.S.S.R."1
Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union stretches
from the Pripet Marshes near the Polish border to the
Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic to Asia should be
enough in itself to indicate that it also suffers from
regionalism.

Thus, the Soviet Union would have to be

considered as suffering from a high amount of subcul
tural pluralism (see Figure I, Condition V I ) .
Now according to Dahl, "at least three conditions
seem to be essential if a country with considerable
subcultural pluralism is to maintain its conflicts at
2
a low enough level to sustain a polyarchy:"
no ethnic,
religious, or regional subculture can be denied the
opportunity to participate m

governing;

3

a high level

of security must be perceived by the various subcultures;

4

and polyarchy must be perceived of as being

effective.^

With the Russian majority dominating the

Union in such a manner as to provoke charges of "Russi
fication," there exists little security for the various

^Background Notes: U.S.S.R. . op. cit., p. 1.
2
Dahl, op. cit., p. 114.
3
loc. cit., p. 115.
4
loc. cit., p. 118.
5loc. cit., p. 119.
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subcultures.

Furthermore, while the Democratic Movement

has in many ways indicated faith in polyarchy, those
occupying the leadership positions of political authority
most certainly do not consider polyarchy as a viable
solution to the subculture problem.

For some of the

subcultural groups by nature of their stance on inde
pendence are permanently in opposition (see Figure I,
Condition V 2).
Domination by ja foreign power
As Dahl comments, "the destiny of a country is
never wholly in the hands of its own people.

In some

cases, domination imposed by people from outside the
country can be so decisive as to override the effects
of...other conditions...."^

Now while there were other

setbacks for the development of Russia, the hardest came
in the thirteenth century and lasted well over 200 years.
"This shock was the invasion in force of the Mongols,
2
or Tatars."
Most certainly, no one can deny that the
Tatar invasion had its impact on the growth of tradi
tional peasant agrarian institutions, if only to

1loc. cit., p. 189.
2
Blum, Jerome, Lord and Peasant in Russia: From
the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 58.
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accentuate certain aspects of this evolution.

It must

be concluded, therefore, that the strong and persistent
Tatar domination of the historical predecessor of the
Soviet Union was a highly unfavorable factor for the
development of polyarchy (see Figure I, Condition VI).
Beliefs of political activists
Undoubtedly, Dahl'*' is correct when he says that
"...the greater the belief within a given country in
the legitimacy of the institutions of polyarchy, the
greater the chances for polyarchy."

Furthermore, "as

with other beliefs, the views of activists and leaders
are likely to be more crucial than those of other
2
people."
For regardless of how other factors fit the
conditions that are either more or less favorable for
the development of polyarchy, "...the beliefs of the
political activists are a key stage in the complex
processes by which historical sequences or subcultural
cleavages, for example, are converted into support for
one kind of regime or another."^

Thus, the beliefs of

the political activists are the forces which shape the

^Dahl, op. cit., p. 129.
2
loc. cit., p. 131.
3
loc. cit., p. 124.
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objective conditions for or against change and, if for
change, the direction of change.
There can be little doubt that the Soviet people
perceive the contradictions of the Soviet system as a
conflict between “the people" and those leaders who
abuse the people's trust.

Whether or not a polyarchy

could be built on their perception of "collectivity of
interest" can probably be judged upon their emphasis on
the collective interest of "the people" rather than the
legitimacy of a polyarchy that is inclusive of those
who favor public contestation.

The crux of the matter

lies "...in the obsession and categorical conviction in
the rightness of one's own ideal which leads first to
intolerance and then to reprisals against those who
think differently."^

From 1917 to the present the

building of socialism has been conducted according to a
"Party line" and those of a different mind have suffered
the despotism of violence and persecution.

Duty to the

"truth" as defined by "need" during the struggle to
build socialism would have undoubtedly changed little
but the names of the builders of the cause for which the

Pospielovsky, Dimitri, "The Diary of Ekaterina
Olitskaia: A Social Revolutionary Recalls the Times
of Leninist Terror." Radio Liberty Research Paper, No.
39. New York, N.Y.: Radio Liberty Committee, 1970,
p. 18.
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struggle has been endured, no matter what group of
protagonists had come to represent political authority.
The members of the Democratic Movement, most certainly,
represent a divergence from the fanatical idealists who
gave, and continue to give, themselves completely to
their narrow group and its perception of the "road to
socialism."

Still, other than the Democrats, both "the

people" as a whole and those who represent political
authority have not been converted to any great extent
to a belief in the legitimacy of polyarchy.

The atti

tude of the Democrats, however, can perhaps be thought
of as the necessary preface to the general development
of such beliefs (see Figure I, Condition VII 1).
"The idea is highly plausible, certainly, that
beliefs about the nature of authority relationships
between government and the governed are crucial to the
chances for the emergence of different kinds of
regimes."^

The fact that the Soviet people have been

historically, and are presently so, "socialized" to a
concept of obedience to a central source of authority,
precludes any serious conceptualization of a political
pattern of contestation.

Their whole political culture

experience, despite the war waged against religion by

^Dahl, op. cit., p . 141.
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political authority and the propaganda concerning the
equality of women, remains essentially one of authori
tarian relationships.

Despite the progress made since

the death of Stalin and the development of the Demo
crat* s rejection, in general the representatives of
political authority perceive to a great extent that
only unilateral authority is legitimate (see Figure I,
Condition VII 2).
Despite the socialization of Soviet citizens to
the belief that their government is highly effective,
the rising expectations of the Soviet consumer are
beginning to create questions that the belief is
increasingly less effectively containing.

Furthermore,

the growth of the belief that the government is chron
ically ineffective has become more significant because
of adherents that the belief is obtaining among not only
Democrats on the outside of political authority, but
also because of such insiders as a substantial number
of economists and others.

They perceive that the system

requires basic changes and/or outside assistance.
This is said to have led to the basic policy
decision about 1970 to turn increasingly west
ward, particularly to the United States, for
the vast amounts of new technology and invest
ment needed to make up the lag and convert the
Soviet economy into a more modern and efficient
mechanism. To insure that the new SovietUnited States relationship will not be a
transitory thaw but a long-term linkage, the
Russians have been seeking to commit American
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industrialists to deals extending over
periods of 20 and 30 years or more. These
long-range, commitments are designed to give
the Soviet Union enough time to make up its
present lag behind the West.
Many of the Democrats, particularly the scientists like
Sakharov, recognize that outside assistance will not be
sufficient until there are basic changes in the system
as well.

Certainly, most of those who represent politi

cal authority are hoping that the outside assistance
will be sufficient.

Some changes, however, have already

taken place.
In an effort to introduce greater flexibility
and efficiency into the planning and manage
ment of the economy, the Soviet Union has
already been relying on Western practices,
although the basic system of state control
remains, of course, unchanged. In a manage
ment reform now in progress, the control of
industry is being focused to a large extent
in a new network of Government corporations
that will have a greater voice in research
and development and in the promotion of ex
port products.
In economic planning, too,
the Government has thrown its support
increasingly to a new generation of econo
mists who have been using Western planning
tools and development techniques in forecast
ing a more balanced growth of the Soviet
economy.2
Thus, it can be said that an increasing number of politi
cal activists have come to support a more polyarchical

Shabad, Theodore, "Russians Seek Ways to Spur
Their Economy," in The New York Times. 17 June 1973,
Section 3, p. 5.
^ibid.
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means by which to resolve problems.

In that respect

polyarchy is increasingly more accepted as an effective
way in which to solve at least some problems (see
Figure I, Condition VII 3).
Quite certainly, "public contestation requires a
good deal of trust in one's opponents:

they may be

opponents, but they are not implacable enemies."^

This

requirement for the development of polyarchy has been
lacking at least since the founding of the Soviet state,
and probably earlier.

For at least since 1917 the

opponents of whoever was the leadership of those repre
senting political authority have been portrayed as
"enemies."

In the past, even the opposition was divided

into different groups which often perceived each other
as enemies.

While this mutual distrust still exists

between political authority and its opponents, a
greater degree of trust has developed in other rela
tionships.

Greater trust within the Party is exemplified

by the fact that the losers of internal Party struggles
are no longer executed, but rather are allowed to re
tire or step down for reasons of poor health.

The

Democratic Movement itself represents the greatest
stride of mutual trust in Soviet history, or even in the

^Dahl, op. cit., p. 152.
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history of the Russian empire.

It can only be concluded,

then, that the development of trust in others has made
highly significant progress since the death of Stalin
(see Figure I , Condition VII 4).
As Dahl points out, "trust is obviously related...
to the capacities of people for engaging freely fnd
easily in cooperative actions"1 and "...extreme beliefs
in either strict competition or strict cooperation
probably generate an unfavorable environment for poly2
archy...."
While the opposition to political authority
has historically viewed objective situations in the
either/or perspective, the members of the Democratic
Movement view their relationship with each other and
with political authority in a cooperative-competitive
perspective.

"Conflict, competition, and cooperation

are all viewed as normal aspects of social relationships
which contribute to a healthy, vigorous, progressive
society."^

As mentioned, even the harshness of internal

Party conflict has been tempered during the two decades
since the death of Stalin.

Like the development of

trust in the Soviet Union, the development of the

1loc. cit., pp. 152-53.
2
loc. cit., p. 160.
^loc. cit., p. 155.
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political activist's belief that political relationships
should be cooperative-competitive rather than strictly
cooperative or strictly competitive is a highly sig
nificant prerequisite to the spread of this perspective
among the political activists throughout the system (see
Figure I , Condition VII 5).
As trust and cooperative action are related, so
are cooperation and compromise.

For quite naturally,

cooperation would be rather difficult without compromise.
Indeed, compromise is the cooperation b o m of trust.
Yet compromise is the result of mutual concessions,
and political authority has compromised its positions
rather infrequently.

It does not recognize compromise

as necessary or desirable.

While the realities of

objective situations have occasionally resulted in the
compromise of political authority positions, these con
stituted what were perceived to be temporary expediencies
rather than surrender of a position.

However, internal

Party conflict has, since the death of Stalin, found
compromise both necessary and desirable.

Also, compro

mise is part of the philosophy of the Democratic
Movement.

As regards the relationship between the

Democratic Movement and political authority, though,
political authority has not yet found compromise to be
necessary and many Democrats have concluded that
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compromise is less possible than they originally per
ceived.

Thus, while since Stalin's death there has

been greater acceptance of the necessity and desir
ability of compromise within groups, due to the behavior
of political authority there has been little compromise
between political authority and its opposition (see
Figure I , Condition VII 6).
The implications for change
If the chance that the Soviet Union will be
governed by a regime in which opportunities for public
contestation are available to the great bulk of the
population depends on Dahl's seven sets of conditions,
then there can be little doubt that it is highly un
likely that such a regime will come to power in the
near future.

Yet it is equally evident that since the

death of Stalin the Soviet environment reflects condi
tions more favorable to polyarchy.

Dahl himself

recognizes that
in a full hegemony the first step may be noth
ing more or less than some kind of understanding
that in conflicts within the ruling groups the
losers will not be punished by death or imprison
ment, exile, or total destitution. In this
respect the change in the USSR from Stalin's
hegemony to the post-Stalinist system was a
profound step toward liberalization.!

^loc. cit., p. 218.
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In fact, developments pointing to the evolution toward
polyarchy in the Soviet Union reflect highly signifi
cant charges that have taken place over the last twenty
years.

In particular, the policy of “co-optation" of

specialists from various fields has contributed to the
fractionalization of political authority.

Although they

work within the official institutional framework, these
"co-opted" experts often lobby for support for their
respective specialties.

The process has evolved to the

point where many members of the apparatus actually appear
to perceive their role as representing whatever respon
sibility they have been assigned or have assumed.^This development might be considered a preface for
intra-Party democracy, which would be a major step in
the direction of polyarchy.
It is the pace of this change that concerns Andrei
2
Amalrik. For to Amalrik, the ability of the Soviet
system to adapt and survive will depend upon the speed
with which the "middle class" or the "class of

1See Hough, Jerry F., "The Party Apparatchiki." in
Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. edited by H. Gordon
Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 47-92.
2
Amalrik, Andrei,. Will the Soviet Union Survive
Until 1984? New. York and Evanston: Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 1970, pp. 40-41.
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specialists" can manage to reorganize society.

While

the process of the development of conditions favoring
polyarchy should probably not take the centuries that
were required in Great Britain, for example, rationally
they must be estimated to be "considerably more than a
generation away."^

However, highly uncertain trains of

events (the "accidents" or "nonaccidents" of history)
must always be regarded as the unpredictable element
rendering all things vulnerable to change.

World-wide,

perhaps the most predictable unpredictable force for
change in the last two decades has been the general
2
phenomenon of army take-overs. As Reddaway has pointed
out, traditions of direct military intervention in
politics are weak in Russia.

Nevertheless,

it is appropriate that we should be alert to
changes in political-military relations as a
force for change in Soviet society, particu
larly if the political leadership proves inept
or divided and allows the Zhukov syndrome of
1957 to become the norm of the Soviet system.3

^Dahl, op. cit., p. 45.
2
See Reddaway, Peter, Uncensored Russia: Protest
and Dissent in the Soviet Union. New York: American
Heritage Press, 1972, p. 171.
^Thomas, John R . , "Forces for Change: The Soviet
Military as a Force for Change," in Analysis of the
USSR1s 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan.
op. cit., p. 24.
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A cross-group alignment phenomenon in which "...some of
the political and military leaders find themselves in
opposition to other political and military leaders"^
has already been a factor in changes that have left the
2
Soviet system altered.
"Moreover, specific foreign
policy and domestic issues may bring shifting alignments
of political and military leaders at any given time,
depending on the issue under discussion in Moscow."

3

The Soviet military as a_ force for change
While there may exist several factors which have
potential as stimulants for direct Soviet military
intervention in politics, defeat in war and economic
deterioration are two that relate directly to Amalrik's
4
fears. Welch and Smith have suggested that "defeat m
war, particularly if accompanied by a belief that the

^loc. cit., p. 23.
2
Khrushchev1s rise to power with the help of the
military and the development of its role in decision
making which has culminated in the rise of Marshal
Grechko to full membership in the Politburo serves as
an example of how the power position of the CPSU has
changed.
3Thomas, op. cit., p. 23.
4
Smith, Arthur K. and Welch, Claude E., Jr.,
Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military
Relations. North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury
Press, 1974, p. 22„
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government failed to give the aimed forces sufficient
support, increases the likelihood of military interven
tion."

They have also suggested that "the likelihood

of military intervention rises with a perceived deter
ioration of economic conditions, especially if
accompanied by a belief that the government cannot
resolve or is responsible for, this deterioration."^Amalrik has raised the spector of defeat in war (or the
inability to obtain victory) and economic deterioration
operating in tandem to produce horrors shadowing both
the 1905-07 and the 1917-20 Russian revolutions.

The

vehicle for such a cataclysm would be a protracted and
exhausting military conflict with the People's Republic
of China.
Most certainly, the inability of the Soviet Union
and China to subjugate their divergent national inter
ests bodes ill for the possibility of a peaceful
resolution of the two nations' differences.

The Soviet

Union wants the People's Republic of China back behind
the Great Wall and, in the long run, that is not likely.
China wants the Soviet Union back in Europe and, of
course, the USSR rejects that.

The danger not only re

mains, however, but grows as China's strength grows.

1loco cit., p. 26.
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In attempting to come to terms with the Chinese threat,
the Soviets have explored various avenues.

The range

extends from contemplation of a pre-emptive strike^- to
encouraging Soviet farmers to settle the agricultural
2
lands along the Chinese border, and even includes a
somewhat humorous linguistic maneuver of giving Russian
names to nine towns that previously bore names of
Chinese origin in an attempt to remove evidence that
the region was once Chinese."^

All such solutions,

though, could only be short term.

Unless the Soviets

eventually satisfy China's territorial claims, the
Soviet Union will probably have to defend her terri
tories militarily.

However, regardless of the Soviets'

ability to defend their Asian possessions, such a con
flict would be bound to have devastating effects on the
Soviet economy.

It is at this very point where Amalrik

fears that the combined weight of military defeat or
stalemate and economic deterioration will result in

^See Alsop, Joseph, "Thought Out of China: Go
Versus No-Go," in The New York Times Magazine, March 11,
1973. Also see Givertzman, Bernard, "Soviet Bid for
Anti-China Pact Discussed," in The New York Times.
May 25, 1973.
2
See Shabad, Theodore, "Soviet Spurs Settlement
Near China, Apparently to Affirm Claims to Lands," in
The New York Times. August 5, 1973.
^See "China Assails New Siberia Names," in The
New York Times. March 8, 1973.
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upheaval, that military political activity could be ex
pected to reach its peak.

Such activity might involve

simple "refusal to protect the government from
violence...

or could involve "overt rebellion. using
2
armed violence...."
Whatever political activity the

military selected as its initial tool, it could be
expected that responsibility for restoring order would
ultimately rest with them if the power and influence of
the government and its security forces are undermined
to the extent of being either neutralized or destroyed.
The resultant military regime would be either
reformist, guardian, or some sort of combination.
The essence of military guardianship, present
in all its various forms, is the overwhelming
value placed by the armed forces on political
stability and order or on their own corporate
interests. This is not to say that the
guardian role necessarily opposes all social
change, but merely that the officers consider
change to be of secondary importance and re
quire that it take place through a gradual and
orderly process. Military guardians are, above
all, "law and order" men. Their loyalty is
owed to the national interest as they them
selves define it.... 3

Abrahamsson, Bengt, Military Professionalization
and Political Power. Beverly Hills, California: Sage
Publications, 1972, p. 143.
2ibid.
3
Smith and Welch, Jr., op. cit., p. 67.
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While it is more likely that the praetorian regime
would be of the guardian type, it can be ej e c t e d that
the early idealistic and simplistic command decision
approach to problem solving will soon prove to be no
more effective them the dispossessed government.

Thus,

unless key civilian sectors agree to cooper
ate with the military (preferably, to support
it) the military will find its capacity to
govern effectively simply evaporates. Civil
disobedience and general noncooperation with
military rule may lead to a breakdown of vital
governmental functions and widespread disrup
tion of the network of social and economic
^
transactions on which m o d e m societies depend.
What is more, as the military becomes increasingly
technology oriented it will increasingly have more in
2
common with Amalrik1s "class of specialists."
This
could very easily result in a more reformist military
regime.

Their claim to the mantle of authority would

thus become bound up with the general movement for
reform.
Projections for the Future
What can be concluded from this investigation into
the adaptability of the Soviet system is that one should

^loc. cit., p. 63.
2
For a discussion concerning dissent among the
Soviet military, see Gerstenmaier, Cornelia, The Voices
of the Silent. New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc.,
1972, pp. 221-227.
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expect more of the same, at least until that "highly
uncertain train of events" pulls into the station.

The

most vociferous members of the Democratic Movement can
expect to be removed from the political scene by one
means or another whenever it is deemed cost effective.
If a dissenter is well known in the West, he might be
"allowed" to leave the Soviet Union.

Whatever "punish

ment" he will receive will depend upon a hodgepodge of
things ranging from the international situation to the
/

feelings of some local Party hack.

Yet political

activity on the part of Democrats should not be expected
to cease.

For while such activity might assume a lower

profile, as long as the objective situation remains
unaltered dissident activity will be fomented.

The

situation might, perhaps, be pictured in the mind as
the wave action on a rock formation on a seashore.

Each

wave of dissent, separated by periods of repression and
stagnation, will be stronger partly because of the
experience provided by the continuity between genera
tions of protesters.^
The Soviet Union of today is, perhaps not radically,
but all the same, fundamentally different from the way
it was twenty years ago.

The leadership presently

^Jacaby, Susan and Astrachan, Antony, "Soviet
Dissent: An Ebb Tide." World 6/19/73. p. 16.
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representing political authority is in a "holding
pattern."

When they pass or are removed from the

political scene it can be expected that the "socialist
system" will remain but that the new leadership will
increasingly find it possible to accommodate the Demo
cratic Movement and, therefore, formal institutionalized
coalitions.

It cannot be assumed that the industrial

revolution and the economically necessitated communica
tions revolution will not affect the Soviet Union as
much as they have affected the West.

The question

remains as to whether there is time for such an evolu
tion before some "accident of history" radically alters
the course of events.
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